{"id":76065,"date":"2026-07-16T09:18:08","date_gmt":"2026-07-16T13:18:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.globalvillagespace.com\/tech\/?p=76065"},"modified":"2026-07-16T09:19:39","modified_gmt":"2026-07-16T13:19:39","slug":"edsels-failure-and-fords-reinvention-how-a-corporate-catastrophe-paved-the-way-for-the-mustangs-success","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.globalvillagespace.com\/tech\/edsels-failure-and-fords-reinvention-how-a-corporate-catastrophe-paved-the-way-for-the-mustangs-success\/","title":{"rendered":"Edsel\u2019s Failure and Ford\u2019s Reinvention How a Corporate Catastrophe Paved the Way for the Mustang\u2019s Success"},"content":{"rendered":"

What Drives a Corporate Catastrophe? The Edsel as a Case Study in Strategic Myopia<\/p>\n

The Edsel\u2019s legacy as a byword for corporate failure is not simply a matter of poor product-market fit or unfortunate timing. Rather, the evidence suggests that the Edsel project exposes the deeper structural vulnerabilities of mid-century American corporate governance\u2014where ambition, internal politics, and the limits of market forecasting collided with the realities of consumer psychology. Ford\u2019s attempt to emulate General Motors\u2019 multi-brand strategy was, on paper, a rational response to competitive pressure. Yet, the protracted delay in mounting this response\u2014decades after GM\u2019s ascendancy\u2014reflects a pattern of organizational inertia and leadership conflict that would ultimately undermine the Edsel\u2019s prospects.<\/p>\n

Why Did Ford Misread the Market? The Mirage of the Mid-Price Segment<\/p>\n

Ford\u2019s strategic calculus rested on the assumption that the mid-priced car segment would remain robust, justifying the introduction of a new brand to slot between Ford and Mercury. However, this assumption proved fatally flawed. The mid-1950s boom that inspired the Edsel\u2019s conception gave way to the 1958 recession, shrinking the segment by 40% in just two years. While some observers attribute the Edsel\u2019s failure to external economic shocks, a closer reading suggests that Ford\u2019s internal forecasting models failed to account for the volatility of consumer preferences and macroeconomic cycles. The company\u2019s reliance on historical data\u2014rather than scenario planning or sensitivity analysis\u2014left it exposed when the market pivoted toward smaller, more economical vehicles. The planned Edsel B, a compact that might have mitigated this risk, was sidelined by shifting priorities and ultimately rebranded as the Comet, which ironically outsold the entire Edsel line in its first year.<\/p>\n

How Did Internal Dynamics Sabotage Execution? The Perils of Turf Wars and Technocracy<\/p>\n

The Edsel\u2019s development was shaped by a constellation of competing interests within Ford\u2019s executive ranks. The ascendancy of the so-called \u201cWhiz Kids\u201d\u2014statistically minded, technocratic managers like Robert McNamara\u2014brought a new rigor to cost control and organizational discipline. Yet, this managerial revolution also fostered a culture of internal rivalry and short-termism. The evidence indicates that McNamara, skeptical of the entire mid-priced strategy, began planning the Edsel\u2019s demise before the car even launched. Product planning, marketing, and dealer network expansion proceeded in a context of divided loyalties and shifting mandates. The result was a brand that lacked both a clear identity and sustained executive sponsorship. The exclusive Edsel dealer network, intended to match GM\u2019s reach, instead isolated new dealers from established customer bases and exposed them to disproportionate risk when the brand faltered.<\/p>\n

Was the Edsel\u2019s Design Doomed from the Start? The Limits of Differentiation Under Constraint<\/p>\n

Much has been made of the Edsel\u2019s controversial vertical grille and its polarizing aesthetics. While design chief Roy Brown\u2019s rejection of tailfins and embrace of European cues was, in retrospect, ahead of its time, the methodological constraints imposed by Ford\u2019s platform-sharing mandate left little room for genuine innovation. The requirement to use existing body shells, with only superficial differentiation, undermined the promise of \u201caesthetic uniqueness.\u201d The resulting product was neither sufficiently aspirational to lure buyers from GM\u2019s established mid-range brands nor distinct enough to create a new market niche. The Edsel\u2019s technical novelties\u2014such as the Teletouch transmission and self-adjusting brakes\u2014were insufficient to overcome consumer skepticism, especially when initial quality control failures marred the press launch.<\/p>\n

Who Bore the Hidden Costs? Dealers, Employees, and the Second-Order Fallout<\/p>\n

The narrative of the Edsel as a corporate debacle often overlooks the human and institutional collateral damage. Dealers, lured by the promise of exclusive territories and rapid growth, invested heavily in facilities and inventory\u2014only to find themselves abandoned as Ford\u2019s commitment wavered. Many faced financial ruin, their fortunes tied to a brand that was quietly being written off by its own parent company. White-collar employees, particularly those in the newly formed Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln division, experienced abrupt layoffs as the brand was wound down. The broader lesson is that corporate experimentation at scale, when not undergirded by long-term strategic commitment, can externalize risk onto the most vulnerable stakeholders.<\/p>\n

Did the Edsel\u2019s Failure Seed Future Success? The Paradox of Unintended Consequences<\/p>\n

Paradoxically, the infrastructure and organizational learning generated by the Edsel program laid the groundwork for Ford\u2019s subsequent triumphs. The expanded factory capacity in Michigan and California, built to accommodate Edsel\u2019s ambitious production targets, enabled the rapid scaling of the Falcon and, more consequentially, the Mustang. The latter\u2019s explosive success\u2014417,000 units sold in its first year, far exceeding projections\u2014was made possible by the very investments that had seemed wasteful in the wake of Edsel\u2019s collapse. This suggests that, under certain conditions, the sunk costs of failure can become the enabling assets of future innovation. Yet, this interpretation remains contested: it is unclear whether the Mustang\u2019s success would have been possible without the painful lessons and infrastructure inherited from the Edsel era, or whether alternative investments might have yielded even greater returns.<\/p>\n

What Judgment Should the Informed Reader Draw?<\/p>\n

The Edsel story resists reduction to a single moral or managerial lesson. It is tempting to attribute its failure to hubris, poor timing, or flawed design. Yet, such explanations obscure the more complex interplay of structural inertia, internal politics, and the unpredictable dynamics of consumer markets. The evidence suggests that successful innovation at scale requires not only technical and marketing acumen, but also organizational alignment and a willingness to adapt strategy as conditions change. For decision-makers, the Edsel case underscores the importance of scenario planning, stakeholder risk assessment, and the dangers of over-relying on historical precedent in volatile markets. For those affected\u2014dealers, employees, and even consumers\u2014the Edsel remains a cautionary tale about the costs of corporate experimentation when the underlying commitment is ambivalent or divided.<\/p>\n

Why Does the Edsel Endure in Memory?<\/p>\n

Despite its commercial failure, the Edsel\u2019s story persists in the cultural imagination, not merely as a punchline but as a touchstone for debates about innovation, risk, and the limits of managerial rationality. The continued existence of thousands of Edsels, the vibrancy of owners\u2019 clubs, and the car\u2019s surprising auction values all point to a second life as an object of fascination and community. In this sense, the Edsel\u2019s afterlife complicates the narrative of failure, suggesting that even the most notorious missteps can generate enduring forms of value\u2014social, historical, and even economic\u2014beyond the intentions of their creators.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\"For<\/a><\/p>\n

It’s famous as an automotive disaster, but is also a very interesting one – and there’s a twist in the tale…<\/p>\n

\n

For embarrassing, grand-scale corporate catastrophes there was once only one word: Edsel.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Over\u00a060 years ago<\/strong>, Ford spent $250 million –\u00a0perhaps $2.5 billion in today\u2019s money<\/strong>\u00a0– on the launch of a new brand whose chief impact was to become known as one of the worst product launches\u00a0of all time. The tale behind it became a case study for the corporate world and the name became a synonym for failure.<\/p>\n

This is the story of how it was born, how it died on November 19th\u00a01959, and how its failure ironically laid the foundation stone for one of Ford\u2019s\u00a0most remarkable successes\u2026<\/strong><\/p>\n

\n

Ford v General Motors<\/h2>\n

\"Ford\n<\/p>\n

Despite its ultimate failure, the thinking behind the Edsel division was sound. Back in the mid \u201850s Ford had three brands \u2013 Ford<\/strong> itself, Mercury<\/strong> and Lincoln<\/strong> \u2013 whereas General Motors<\/strong> had five, its mid-range Oldsmobile<\/strong>, Pontiac<\/strong> and Buick<\/strong> marques flanked by affordable Chevrolet<\/strong> and prestigious Cadillac<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Against this trio Ford could only muster Mercury<\/strong>, but neither this nor upscale Lincoln <\/strong>were profitable, in stark contrast to GM\u2019s money-making armoury of marques. The problem was hardly new. Ford had been grappling with it since the 1920s, with the rise of the multi-brand General Motors.\u00a0<\/p>\n

Why it took three decades to mount a full-scale riposte is a story worthy of Netflix. Jealousy, intransigence, hubris and empire-building produced paralysis, poor decisions, few winners and many losers<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

Henry Ford & Ford Model T<\/h2>\n

\"Henry\n<\/p>\n

This is the car that democratised motoring, pictured with its creator. Outsold only by the VW Beetle<\/strong>, it made Henry Ford<\/strong> (1863-1947) richer than some countries. But he would later refuse to change his ways, or the car that had propelled him there. By 1927, Ford\u2019s US market share had plunged to 19%\u00a0<\/strong>from 48%\u00a0<\/strong>in 1922. The Model T<\/strong> was old, and newly affluent buyers were trading up. Ford had nothing to offer them – but GM did. Ford belatedly realised it was making customers for GM.<\/p>\n

\n

Alfred P Sloan<\/h2>\n

\"Alfred\n<\/p>\n

Alfred P Sloan<\/strong> (1875-1966) is a major reason why we car buyers have enjoyed so much choice for so long. He was the architect behind the revival of 1920s General Motors and its mish-mash of money-losing brands accumulated by its co-founder, the fairy-tale charming, corporate shopaholic that was William C. Durant<\/strong> (1861-1947).\u00a0<\/p>\n

Sloan arranged brands and models hierarchically to produce \u201ca car for every purse and purpose,\u201d his industrial enabler the canny sharing of bodies across brands, each flaunting a distinctive, add-on d\u00e9cor.<\/p>\n

\n

Edsel Ford<\/h2>\n

\"Edsel\n<\/p>\n

It was Henry Ford\u2019s son Edsel Ford<\/strong> (1893-1943, pictured driving here) who finally convinced his father (alongside him) to replace the Model T \u2013 so abruptly, that there was a gap between the T\u2019s demise and the Model A\u2019s<\/strong> introduction. He also persuaded his father to buy struggling luxury marque Lincoln<\/strong>, which Edsel successfully revived.<\/p>\n

\n

1936 Lincoln-Zephyr<\/h2>\n

\"1936\n<\/p>\n

The streamlined, art deco V12 Lincoln-Zephyr<\/strong> was Ford\u2019s first medium-priced model. Conceived by Edsel Ford, it sold well enough to rescue Lincoln, despite being too pricey to win a big chunk of the segment.<\/p>\n

Relatively crude suspension and outmoded mechanical brakes were a disappointing contrast to its bold design, but despite the V12\u2019s troubled reliability it was a success.<\/p>\n

\n

1939 Mercury-Ford<\/h2>\n

\"1939\n<\/p>\n

Edsel\u2019s second mid-market shot was with new badge\u00a0Mercury<\/strong>. Initially he insisted on appending the Ford name to it, somewhat undermining the move upscale. \u201cFord\u201d was soon dropped, however, and Mercury got off to a good start before the second world war started.<\/p>\n

Despite these successes, Edsel\u2019s father gave his only son a hard time. Stomach cancer killed him in 1943, aged just 49<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

Henry Ford II<\/h2>\n

\"Henry\n<\/p>\n

With Edsel gone and Henry Ford retired, Edsel\u2019s 28 year old son Henry Ford II<\/strong> (1917-1987, pictured right with grandpa) became CEO in 1945 of a company short of structure<\/strong>, new products <\/strong>and executives <\/strong>to lead it, his grandfather\u2019s sometimes paranoid, often brutal reign gutting the business of senior management.<\/p>\n

By the end of the war, Ford had almost no corporate plan, its engineering, finance and design departments barely existed and its plants were in disarray<\/strong>, its munitions orders having swiftly ceased with the arrival of peace. Ford swiftly poached GM\u2019s Ernest R Breech<\/strong> (1897-1978), the man groomed to succeed Sloan, and set about copying GM\u2019s organisational structure.<\/p>\n

\n

Whiz Kids <\/h2>\n

\"Whiz\n<\/p>\n

Henry Ford II also hired a group of\u00a0former US\u00a0Army\u00a0Air Force officers<\/strong>. Business-school graduates, they were cost-control and statistical analysis advisers \u2013 expertise conspicuously absent in a company that weighed bundles of invoices to estimate their value.<\/p>\n

Quickly named The Whiz Kids<\/strong>, they\u00a0<\/strong>soon made the finance department their power base, setting the scene for a corporate turf war that would bear heavily on the Edsel brand. One of the most famous of them, Robert McNamara<\/strong>, is pictured here at far right.<\/p>\n

\n

GM 5<\/h2>\n

\"GM\n<\/p>\n

Ford was baffled at how GM managed to make money from lower volume models, even if they were priced higher. It was even more baffled when it belatedly learned the art of costing cars, discovering for the first time how much money<\/strong> Lincoln and Mercury had been losing.<\/p>\n

GM’s secret lay in using three body sizes across all its brands, their similarities cleverly disguised with chrome, colour and if necessary, a few model-specific panels, as GM usefully illustrated in this 1957 advertisement. This realisation added rocket fuel to the Edsel <\/strong>project.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\n

E-car<\/h2>\n

\"E-car\"\n<\/p>\n

The task of devising a product plan for the new E-car (for Experimental \u2013 the Edsel name was yet to come) fell to product planning boss Lewis Crusoe<\/strong> (1895-1973, pictured) and Whiz Kid Jack Reith<\/strong>. Crusoe was the father of the Thunderbird<\/strong>, while Reith was fresh from turning around Ford\u2019s troubled French division.<\/p>\n

They produced a far-reaching strategy not only for the new E-Car but also Lincoln and Mercury, to target Buick<\/strong>, Oldsmobile <\/strong>and Pontiac<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

Plan<\/h2>\n

\"Plan\"\n<\/p>\n

The Crusoe-Reith plan was highly ambitious. Three core bodies were planned for Ford, Edsel, Mercury and Lincoln, topped off with new ultra-luxury brand Continental<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

The plan was less costly than it sounds, with some of the bodies already under development, and it would give Ford five brands, Edsel to slot between Ford and Mercury, now moved upscale, matching GM\u2019s \u2018big five<\/strong>\u2019.<\/p>\n

\n

Network Gains<\/h2>\n

\"Network\n<\/p>\n

Despite the strategy\u2019s risky ambition, Ford\u2019s board was primarily attracted by its dealer network plans. Ford and Mercury had 8000 <\/strong>US dealers in 1955, GM 16,500 <\/strong>and Chrysler 10,000<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

Crusoe and Reith figured that adding an exclusive Edsel network would rapidly boost this to 10,600 <\/strong>dealers. Sales boss Jack Davis <\/strong>however worried that moving Mercury upmarket to make way for the new brand might lose customers unwilling to pay more. The all-new, untested dealer network he also considered a risk; he wanted a more measured growth. Nonetheless, on April 15 1955, the \u2018E-car\u2019 plan was born.<\/p>\n

\n

Design<\/h2>\n

\"Design\"\n<\/p>\n

That was the near-impossible brief for young design chief Roy Brown<\/strong> (1916-2013). Impossible, because Ford\u2019s newly adopted interchangeability mission meant using an existing body, the only original elements allowed being the nose and tail, bumpers, rear door lower panel, the bonnet and boot lid, ornamentation and the grille.<\/p>\n

Despite these limitations, the objectives required that \u201caesthetic uniqueness shall be considered essential.\u201d Brown notably rejected the tailfins that were then all the rage, replacing them with boomerang rear-lights that even today look modern. On the fins he was ahead of the curve, as they would be gone from US cars within a few years. \u201cI hated the blasted fins on the Cadillac,\u201d he later said. \u201cThey were dangerous, too<\/strong>.\u201d<\/p>\n

\n

That Vertical Grille<\/h2>\n

\"That\n<\/p>\n

The start point for Brown and his team was to plaster the studio walls with images of existing cars<\/strong>. They soon noticed that the grilles of most current US models were horizontal<\/strong>, but some high-end European models, among them Rolls-Royce<\/strong>, Mercedes-Benz<\/strong> and Jaguar<\/strong>, had vertical air intakes.<\/p>\n

So Brown worked on a vertical approach for Edsel, virtually guaranteeing a stand-out look among its domestic rivals.<\/p>\n

\n

Grille Spill<\/h2>\n

\"Grille\n<\/p>\n

Early sketches of the Edsel showed plenty of elegant promise, a slender vertical ellipse flanked by counter-weighting quarter-bumpers.<\/p>\n

But engineering colleagues demanded a bigger aperture for cooling, the twin-ringed, horse-collar shaped result famously dubbed \u201can Oldsmobile sucking a lemon<\/strong>\u201d, and the grille would become a cornerstone of the car\u2019s marketing (pictured). But it was controversial and to some eyes, ugly.<\/p>\n

\n

Finding a Name – Any Name<\/h2>\n

\"Finding\n<\/p>\n

Edsel<\/strong>. It\u2019s not the sexiest of words. Sociologist-turned-Ford-corporate David Wallace<\/strong> (1908-74) was tasked with finding a name for the new brand, hiring agencies and subjecting his colleagues to post-lunch screenings of suggestions. But he was surprised at how little response he got.<\/p>\n

Suspicious, he dropped BUICK in as a test, the lack of reaction to this GM name confirming his hunch that most attendees used the screenings for an illicit, post-prandial snooze.<\/p>\n

\n

Marianne Moore<\/h2>\n

\"Marianne\n<\/p>\n

Wallace also turned to the literary world and US poet Marianne Moore<\/strong> (1887-1972). It was an arrangement that yielded some of the most elegantly phrased correspondence ever seen in the motor industry, later published in The New Yorker<\/em><\/strong>. And a string of original but hopelessly inappropriate choices.<\/p>\n

Most infamous were Utopian Turtletop<\/strong>, Resilient Bullet<\/strong>, Mongoose Civique<\/strong>, Andante con Moto<\/strong>, Ford Silver Sword<\/strong> and Varsity Stroke<\/strong>. That Moore refused a fee was some compensation.\u00a0<\/p>\n

\n

Edsel\u2019s Name Taken in Vain<\/h2>\n

\"Edsel\u2019s\n<\/p>\n

An ever more desperate Ford ploughed on, advertising agency Foote, Cone & Belding (FC&B) collating a staggering\u00a06000 names<\/strong>, complete with word associations, into six bound volumes. They were presented to an astonished\u00a0Richard E Krafve\u00a0<\/strong>(pictured left), Edsel general manager (and a former Army colonel), who insisted that FC&B\u2019s two offices hack them back to a mere\u00a010\u00a0<\/strong>names.<\/p>\n

Amazingly, four names \u2013\u00a0Citation<\/strong>,\u00a0Corsair<\/strong>,\u00a0Pacer<\/strong>\u00a0and\u00a0Ranger<\/strong>\u00a0\u2013 appeared on both lists. These were presented to a committee chaired by Ernest Breech, who didn\u2019t like any of them. B list names included, incredibly,\u00a0Drof<\/strong>\u00a0– Ford spelt backwards –\u00a0Benson<\/strong>\u00a0(a Ford family first name) and\u00a0Edsel<\/strong>. The man himself would surely have disapproved, and it seems his son certainly did. But despite being CEO, Henry Ford II was persuaded, and\u00a0Edsel\u00a0<\/strong>was decided on November 8 1956, and a logo swiftly created (right).<\/p>\n

\n

Product Planning Plants a Bomb<\/h2>\n

\"Product\n<\/p>\n

Slow sales of Ford\u2019s\u00a0Thunderbird<\/strong>\u00a0two-seater (pictured) were to have far-reaching effects on Edsel. The plan was to turn it into a four-seater hardtop, and to switch it from body-on-frame construction to a unibody, Ford lagging the competition with this development.<\/p>\n

Building the Thunderbird alone with a monocoque wasn\u2019t viable, so the \u201958 Lincolns were switched to a unibody too, which in turn denied Mercury a body-on-frame source for the Super Mercury intended to take the marque upmarket of Edsel. The Mercury and Super Mercury\u00a0would instead all share the same basic architecture<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

The Press Launch<\/h2>\n

\"The\n<\/p>\n

The three-day Edsel media launch included 250 <\/strong>journalists and unusually, their wives<\/strong>. A stunt-driving display and test drives preceded an evening in a nightclub created in the design center, at which 71 <\/strong>scribblers were presented with Edsels to drive to their local dealers.<\/p>\n

One car\u2019s engine seized when its oil-pan fell off, while another scared its driver witless with brake failure<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

\n

McNamara the Knife<\/h2>\n

\"McNamara\n<\/p>\n

The best-known Whiz Kid was Robert McNamara<\/strong> (1916-2009), who by 1956 had risen fast through the ranks. Hugely ambitious, his austere statistical analyses frequently failed to account for the indulgent whims of buyers excited by gimmicks and the status-enhancing power of the automobile. Sales, profit and control were what motivated this man, his powerful sense of logic struggling to see the sense of medium-priced cars unless they sold, and sold big.<\/p>\n

Incredibly, McNamara didn\u2019t even wait for the Edsel to fail, mentioning plans to discontinue the brand to Fairfax Cone<\/strong> (1903-77) of ad agency FC&B on the very evening of Ford\u2019s internal launch party.<\/p>\n

\n

E-Day – 4 September, 1957<\/h2>\n

\"E-Day\n<\/p>\n

On this day \u2013 a Wednesday \u2013 prompted by a huge marketing campaign<\/strong> (pictured), a staggering 2.85 million <\/strong>Americans visited Edsel dealers. There was plenty to see, if not the wheeled revolution promised by the excitable pre-launch hype.<\/p>\n

\n

Innovation<\/h2>\n

\"Innovation\"\n<\/p>\n

Novelties included Teletouch<\/strong> transmission buttons mounted in the steering wheel boss, a revolving drum speedometer<\/strong> that glowed red if you exceeded a pre-determined speed and less visibly, self-adjusting brakes and a three-stage engine cooling system for faster warm-up.<\/p>\n

The last of these was well ahead of its time \u2013 far enough indeed<\/strong> to cause trouble in service \u2013 but the Edsel was no Citro\u00ebn DS<\/strong>, the 1955 French fancy leaping two decades in one fluid-suspended bound.<\/p>\n

\n

At the wheel<\/h2>\n

\"At\n<\/p>\n

In this photo, Henry Ford II<\/strong> (naturally in the driving seat) can be seen alongside younger brothers Benson<\/strong> Ford<\/strong> (centre) and William \u2018Bill\u2019 Clay Ford<\/strong>. Bill Ford was instrumental in ensuring that when Ford went on the stock market in 1956, the family kept 40% <\/strong>of the voting stock rather than the 25% originally planned.<\/p>\n

This ensured effective family control of the company, which continues to this day.<\/p>\n

\n

A Vast Range<\/h2>\n

\"A\n<\/p>\n

Had Ford\u2019s factories been able to supply enough Edsels \u2013 there were assembly issues, many serious \u2013 some of those near-three million Americans would have discovered two basic Edsel sizes from which sprouted no less than 18 varieties<\/strong> of saloon<\/strong>, hardtop<\/strong>, convertible<\/strong> and station wagon<\/strong> arranged into four model families.<\/p>\n

Ironically these were badged Pacer<\/strong>, Ranger<\/strong>, Corsair<\/strong> and Citation<\/strong>, names all previously proposed for the Edsel division itself. This \u2013 and six new Edsel production lines \u2013 was what Ford\u2019s $250 million of ambition had paid for.<\/p>\n

\n

Sales<\/h2>\n

\"Sales\"\n<\/p>\n

More than 6500 <\/strong>Edsels were delivered on the first day, and another 4095 <\/strong>over the next 10. After that, sales sank. The launch was botched, a costly TV Bing Crosby<\/strong> and Frank Sinatra<\/strong> promo on The Ed Sullivan Show <\/strong>failing to restore momentum.<\/p>\n

Most serious, though, was that the mid-price segment had shrunk by 40% <\/strong>over the past two years as America\u2019s long post-war boom came to a sputtering halt during the ‘Eisenhower recession’ of 1958. By October, sales had fallen to an annual rate of 100,000<\/strong> cars \u2013 half the target.<\/p>\n

\n

The Market Moves<\/h2>\n

\"The\n<\/p>\n

That the market shifted McNamara’s way confirmed to him, at least, a reason to kill Edsel<\/strong>. With less money around, suddenly buyers wanted a smaller, more economical model, and many wanted a second car in the household for the first time and had no need for V8-powered vastness; the longest Edsel was 5560mm <\/strong>(219in), and smaller models were hardly compact at 5415mm <\/strong>(213in).<\/p>\n

Ironically there was another model, the Edsel B<\/strong>, under development that would have been much closer to what the market suddenly demanded. A compact saloon, it was developed in parallel with the budget Ford Falcon<\/strong>.<\/p>\n

But with Edsel\u2019s demise it was reassigned to the Lincoln-Mercury division and initially sold without branding as Comet<\/strong> (pictured). Traces of Edsel could be seen in its taillight and dashboard design. Ironically its 116,331<\/strong> first-year sales topped Edsel\u2019s three-year total.<\/p>\n

\n

1959s<\/h2>\n

\"1959s\"\n<\/p>\n

As was Detroit\u2019s way, there would be a refreshed look for the \u201959 Edsels, work starting as soon as the 1958 design was frozen for production in late 1956. The rework was initially ambitious, and included the innovative ergonomic cockpit <\/strong>intended for the original Edsel. But other forces were at play.<\/p>\n

McNamara had become head of product planning in September 1957 as the headwinds facing Edsel strengthened. The scope of the \u201959 models was scaled back, and early in 1959 Edsel was rolled into a new Mercury-Edsel-Lincoln <\/strong>division (M-E-L) that saw thousands of white-collar Edsel employees dismissed, and the big-bodied versions deleted.<\/p>\n

PICTURE:<\/strong> 1959 Edsel Ranger<\/p>\n

\n

Dealers\u2019 Despair<\/h2>\n

\"Dealers\u2019\n<\/p>\n

In spite of the disappointing sales the Edsel network of exclusive dealers continued to grow –\u00a0disastrously<\/strong>, in retrospect – reaching a February 1959 peak of 1568. Some dealers read rumours of the brand\u2019s demise just as they signed on.<\/p>\n

James Nance<\/strong> (1900-1984, pictured), M-E-L general manager (and former Packard boss), was very sympathetic to their plight; he received many at his office in tears, their personal fortunes at risk \u2013 and many took on Mercury franchises. Nance attempted to keep Edsel alive, but McNamara manoeuvred to have him fired<\/strong> in August 1958. Momentum behind the Edsel rapidly drained away and with it Ford’s commitment, despite the hundreds of dealers who had invested so much.<\/p>\n

\n

The Cull<\/h2>\n

\"The\n<\/p>\n

For the 1960 model year the Edsel line-up was pared back to near pointlessness<\/strong>. Only the Ranger <\/strong>remained (a saloon, a hardtop, a convertible, and the Villager wagon, pictured), and it was heavily based on the 1960 Ford. The vertical grille had gone, the car instead distinguished by a split front grille similar to Pontiac\u2019s, the twin vertical taillights more now more memorable than the grille.<\/p>\n

The 1960 Edsel was announced on October 15th 1959, and on November 19th 1959<\/strong> the 2846th <\/strong>\u201960 model and last Edsel was produced, taking the total to 110,810 <\/strong>vehicles.<\/p>\n

\n

The Aftermath<\/h2>\n

\"The\n<\/p>\n

Of Ford\u2019s $250m investment around $100m was lost but the rest was spent on factories, and here\u2019s where this tale has a twist<\/strong>. The compact Falcon <\/strong>(launched in 1959) proved a hit, but that was nothing to compared to the two-door it gave birth to: the Mustang<\/strong>, unveiled in April 1964.<\/p>\n

Deliberately priced to sell, Ford nonetheless only forecast first year sales of 100,000<\/strong> Mustangs. Instead on the day a proud Henry Ford II unveiled the car (pictured) it took 22,000 orders <\/strong>alone. It sold 417,000<\/strong> Mustangs in its first year on sale, making the car the fastest selling in history at that time \u2013 and all made possible because of the increased factory capacity<\/strong> added into Michigan and San Jose, California, a few years earlier for Edsel. Provocatively, for this reason author Thomas Bonsall <\/strong>concluded that while it can be said that “Edsel the car” was a failure, “Edsel the programme” was a success…<\/p>\n

\n

Why did it fail?<\/h2>\n

\"Why\n<\/p>\n

You can blame the name, the controversial grille, over-hyped expectations, poor quality and a market-shrinking recession<\/strong>. But all could have been overcome, and the market would have returned, American affluence and thirst for cars still on the upswing in the wider sense, supported by a surging baby-boom population, which increased from 151 million <\/strong>in 1950 to 203 million <\/strong>by 1970.<\/p>\n

More serious errors were positioning Edsel in Mercury territory<\/strong>, and creating an exclusive network, denying dealers a body of existing customers. That the Ford brand had also introduced the upmarket models didn\u2019t help. Worst of all, though, was the lack of long-term commitment from a warring\u00a0management<\/strong> ultimately led by a man who seemed to understand numbers but not the psychology of car buying.<\/p>\n

PICTURE:<\/strong> 1959 Edsel Ranger Villager<\/p>\n

\n

The people<\/h2>\n

\"The\n<\/p>\n

Henry Ford II<\/strong> went on running Ford until 1979; he was still the dominant figure in the company until his death in 1987, aged 70. Robert McNamara<\/strong> briefly became president of Ford but was then recruited to become Secretary of Defense <\/strong>for President John F Kennedy, and then under Lyndon B Johnson.<\/p>\n

In that role he became embroiled in the direction of another misadventure, this time with more fateful consequences: The Vietnam War<\/strong>. He was later head of the World Bank, where he still had to bear criticisms of his Edsel role. He died in 2009, aged 93.<\/p>\n

Edsel designer Roy Brown<\/strong> defended the car to the end, but the debacle led him to Ford of Europe, where he bounced back with the highly successful\u00a0Cortina<\/strong>. He drove an immaculate grey-and-white 1958 Edsel Pacer <\/strong>almost to his dying day, and strangers would sometimes offer to buy it from him. \u201cWhere the hell were you in 1958?<\/strong>\u201d was his magnificent reply. He died in 2013, aged 95.<\/p>\n

\n

Edsel today<\/h2>\n

\"Edsel\n<\/p>\n

Despite its troubled history – or more probably because of it – affection and interest in Edsel remains high to this day<\/strong>. Even \u2018non-car\u2019 people born decades after the car have heard some of the story. There are thriving owners clubs, a useful unofficial website at Edsel.com<\/strong>, and for an \u2018everyman\u2019 car, a surprising amount of cars are still alive \u2013 and a great community of owners who enjoy getting together (previous picture).<\/p>\n

Edsel \u2013 How many left?<\/strong><\/p>\n

The registry at Edsel.com records 1144<\/strong> 1958 models, 1191<\/strong> 1959s, and 563<\/strong> 1960s as still in existence, a total of 3000 <\/strong>\u2013 and the actual number might be quite a bit higher. Fancy joining the Edsel club? Inevitably they are nearly all in the US and Canada. Running examples can be had from $5000 <\/strong>(\u00a36500), while excellent condition convertibles can go for more than $100,000 <\/strong>(\u00a3130,000).<\/p>\n

The current auction record for Edsel is for predictably one of the rarest variants, the 1960 Ranger Convertible<\/strong>. Thought to be only 10 still in existence, one of them sold for $168,000\u00a0<\/strong>in 2022.\u00a0<\/p>\n

If you enjoyed this story, please click the Follow button above to see more like it from Autocar<\/strong><\/p>\n

Photo Licence: https:\/\/creativecommons.org\/licenses\/by\/4.0\/deed.en<\/a><\/p>\n

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