As frustration with Iran’s political system deepens, calls for its removal have grown more radical. Some now argue that only foreign military action can bring change. Others warn that war would devastate society. In this interview, Fatemeh Aman challenges both views, arguing that history offers no reassuring model for regime change in Iran.
Q: Many people calling for revolution in Iran invoke historical examples. Why do you think those comparisons are misleading?
Because they assume history offers a template. It does not.Analogies are comforting. They suggest that rupture leads somewhere better. But when you look closely, there is no convincing case where a country like Iran was reshaped through external military force without severe social consequences for society.The issue is not moral confusion. It is the lack of a relevant precedent.
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Q: Let’s start with the examples often cited against war. Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya. Supporters of intervention say Iran is different. Are they wrong?
They are partly right, which is often more dangerous than being wrong.Iran is larger. More complex. More institutionalized. But that does not make war safer. It makes outcomes harder to control. Once large scale violence begins, political trajectories become unpredictable.External force does not simply remove regimes. It reshapes societies under stress. Armed groups gain leverage. Authority fragments. Violence becomes the main political language.Iran would not be immune to that dynamic.
Q: So those cases are warnings, not blueprints?
Yes.They do not argue for preserving the status quo. They argue against romanticizing rupture. War narrows political agency very quickly. Ideals give way to whoever controls territory and supply lines.That pattern is consistent.
Q: On the other side, supporters of military regime change point to Germany and Japan. Why do you think those analogies are misread?
Because they remove the conditions that mattered most.Germany and Japan did not democratize because they were bombed. They changed after total defeat in a world war that dismantled their militaries and exhausted their societies. What followed was occupation, financial assistance, and an unusual level of international consensus.None of that exists today.There is no equivalent of the Marshall Plan waiting for Iran. There is no unified authority prepared to manage long-term reconstruction. Rival powers would compete inside any resulting vacuum.
Q: Some point to Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia, which removed the Khmer Rouge, as proof that foreign military action can end even the most brutal regimes. Does that offer a more relevant comparison?
It did remove one of the most violent regimes in modern history. But what followed is often overlooked.Vietnam’s 1978 intervention displaced the Khmer Rouge from Phnom Penh. It did not produce immediate stabilization. It led to occupation, insurgency, and years of international isolation. The new Cambodian government lacked diplomatic recognition for a long time.China launched a retaliatory war against Vietnam in 1979. The Khmer Rouge remained active along the Thai border throughout the 1980s. Cambodia stayed entangled in proxy competition well after the regime itself had been removed.Stabilization came much later. After withdrawal. UN involvement. Negotiation among domestic actors.Ending a regime did not produce rapid recovery.
Q: Rwanda is often cited differently. Not as a success of intervention, but as a case where outside force might have saved lives had it been used in time. Does that change the argument?
It highlights a moral failure. It does not provide a model for regime change through war.In Rwanda, a limited international deployment might have disrupted mass killing in 1994. That is an argument about civilian protection under imminent threat. Not about restructuring a political system from the outside.The genocide ended when a domestic armed movement defeated the government and took control of the state.Invoking Rwanda tends to blur two different questions. Whether outside actors should intervene to halt mass atrocity in real time. And whether they can successfully reshape a political order once a regime is displaced.Those are not the same problem.
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Q: Are there cases where military intervention by outside actors produced relatively positive political outcomes?
A few.The NATO intervention in Bosnia in 1995 helped end a war that had already devastated the country and opened the way for the Dayton Accords. The Australian led intervention in East Timor in 1999 halted militia violence and enabled a UN administered transition to independence.But in both cases, force was used to stabilize a collapsing situation. Not to overthrowa functioning state and reconstruct it from scratch. What followed was years of international administration and negotiated institution building.Even then, outcomes depended on sustained external commitment.These cases show that military force can sometimes contain violence. They say less about dismantling entrenched political systems and replacing them with stable alternatives.
Q: Are there examples where non-military foreign involvement helped produce political change without large scale violence?
Yes.In parts of Eastern Europe after the Cold War, outside actors influenced reform through trade access, institutional benchmarks, and the prospect of membership in European political and economic frameworks. Governments were not displaced by force. Incentives were changed.In South Africa, sanctions and diplomatic isolation raised the cost of maintaining apartheid without dismantling the state through war. Change came through internal negotiation under growing external pressure.Foreign involvement mattered. But it reinforced internal processes rather than replacing them.
Q: You also emphasize geography. Why does that matter so much?
Because geography shapes what violence turns into.Japan was an island. Spillover could be contained. Iran sits at the intersection of multiple regional rivalries. Any rupture would radiate outward and draw others in.That alone makes the comparison difficult.
Q: What about Spain? It is often mentioned as a successful transition.
Spain did not transition through war or foreign intervention.Its political transformation followed the death of the dictator and unfolded through negotiation among domestic elites, the military, and civil society.Spain is an example of internal reconfiguration. Not externally imposed collapse.
Q: Critics might say this analysis risks excusing the Iranian regime. How do you respond to that?
It does not excuse the regime.Organized opposition has been weakened. Dissent has been criminalized. Elections no longer function as a meaningful source of legitimacy. Coercion has replaced consent.Acknowledging that does not require endorsing war.
Q: Then why are calls for foreign military action becoming louder?
Because frustration accumulates.When peaceful avenues for change are blocked year after year, demands for reform shift toward demands for removal. When internal mechanisms appear closed, people begin to look outward.That logic is understandable. It is also risky.
Q: You argue that a limited military strike would not topple the regime. Why not?
Because the system is built for survival under pressure.A limited strike would damage infrastructure and degrade capabilities. But institutions designed to endure sanctions and isolation tend to adapt rather than collapse under calibrated force.
Q: And a prolonged intervention?
That would be worse.It would dismantle the material foundations of everyday life. Electricity. Water. Fuel. Hospitals. Food supply chains.These systems do not belong to regimes alone.
Q: You mention the brief war with Israel as a revealing moment. What did it show?
It showed how quickly internal political conflict is reordered under external threat.During the 12-day war in June 2025, even amid resentment toward the state, there were moments of rally around the flag behavior across parts of society. That did not reflect restored legitimacy. It reflected fear and uncertainty.More important was how the leadership read that reaction. The episode reinforced an institutional belief that external confrontation can suppress internal fragmentation, at least temporarily. That appears to have shaped the state’s posture during the January 2026 crackdown, where protest was treated as a potential second front in a future conflict environment.In a longer war, that dynamic would become embedded in governance.
Q: Some would argue that after years of violence by the state, indifference is impossible. How do you deal with that moral tension?
It cannot be dismissed.Calls for outside removal are often expressions of accumulated trauma from people who feel they have exhausted internal options.But war does not pause suffering in order to correct injustice. It compounds it.
Q: What happens once infrastructure is destroyed?
Hunger and poverty follow quickly. Political attention shifts away from ideals toward survival.By the time costs are fully understood, they are already difficult to reverse.
Q: So where does that leave Iran?
In a difficult place, but not an unknowable one.Iran is not a collapsed state awaiting occupation. It is not Germany in 1945. It is not an island like Japan. It is a large, securitized, regionally embedded society whose rupture would be neither clean nor containable.External military force might remove parts of the governing structure. It would not resolve the deeper political conflict between state and society. That conflict would still have to be worked out internally, under far more difficult conditions than exist today.History offers many examples of regimes collapsing through war. It offers far fewer where societies emerge from that process with stronger institutions.That is the distinction that matters.
About the Author: Fatemeh Aman
Fatemeh Aman has written on Iranian, Afghan, and broader Middle East affairs for over 25 years and advised US and non-governmental officials. A former non-resident fellow at the Middle East Institute and senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, a writer, producer, and anchor at Voice of America, and a correspondent at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, her work has appeared in Jane’s Islamic Affairs Analyst, Jane’s Intelligence Review, and the Stimson Center’s Middle East Perspectives. Follow her on X: @FatemehAman.
