Editor GVS Moeed Pirzada invited Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for an exclusive discussion on his personal journey, U.S. foreign policy, and the challenges in the Muslim world, touching upon his acclaimed book, The Envoy, which offers a unique window into his experiences as a key American diplomat and strategist. Read it here:
Title: Moeed Pirzada with Zalmay Khalilzad: From Afghanistan to Washington, Imran Khan to Trump?
Date:24 Jul 2025
Dr. Moeed Pirzada: As-salamu alaykum. This is Moeed Pirzada. Today, I’m joined by a very distinguished and accomplished personality. I have the privilege of presenting this personality to you. Joining me is Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, who, according to his own admission in his book The Envoy, started his journey from Mazar-e-Sharif, which, according to him, was a very underdeveloped part of Afghanistan at that time.
But then he rose to become an important member of the American academia, passing through the American University of Beirut, then the University of Chicago, rubbing shoulders with some of the most distinguished academics of his time. He was at Columbia University, later at one of the most important policymaking think tanks on the West Coast of the United States, the RAND Corporation. From the RAND Corporation, he became a part of the Republican administrations.
He also served as United States Ambassador to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the United Nations. Ambassador Khalilzad was also the United States Special Representative for the Taliban, aiding in brokering the Doha Accord and the subsequent peace process. A long journey indeed. In the last two years, he has taken a very vocal position on Pakistan, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and for Imran Khan. But in recent months, we have seen that he has been silent since the meeting between the President of the United States, Donald Trump, and COAS Field Marshal Asim Munir. I would like to ask him all these questions.
But first of all, I want to thank you, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Ambassador, thank you so much on behalf of my viewers.
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad: Thank you very much for your invitation. I appreciate this, and I’m looking forward to our conversation.
Dr. Pirzada: My first question is: I feel that very few contemporaries of your generation, starting from Afghanistan and the East, have been able to transcend this consciousness. From someone born in Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, you have, in the same lifetime, become part of the American consciousness — an important decision maker and academic. What do you think have been the most transforming milestones in your career? Was that your school experience in California? The experience at the American University of Beirut? Your time at the University of Chicago? RAND in California? Or meeting your wife, Dr. Cheryl Bernard, at Beirut University?
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Ambassador Khalilzad: Thank you. This is certainly a tough question: what has been the single most important experience? My immediate answer would be that I am the result of all those experiences you mentioned, and perhaps more. That said, moving to America at the age of 15 had a profound impact on my thinking and the trajectory of my life.
My experiences at the American University of Beirut, the University of Chicago, and my studies under Professor Albert Wohlstetter, an eminent American strategist, along with other life experiences, have profoundly shaped me. I also believe the interaction between my background and the opportunities I found in the United States was especially significant. America not only accepted and welcomed me but also made the best use of someone with a background like mine.
There is also luck — being at the right place at the right time, taking advantage of opportunities, and always thinking of alternatives. I learned through my education that there may not be just one way of doing things. Sometimes I could think faster than others in the policy game to come up with approaches that solved problems. All of this has produced what I have done and made me who I am. Certainly, the credit goes to my parents and to Afghanistan. I don’t want to minimise the impact Afghanistan and that region had on me. It still has a big hold on me, even though much more of my life has been spent in the United States, in the West. But its hold is very strong.
Dr. Pirzada: At one point, you mentioned in detail in your book, The Envoy, the role of your mother in encouraging education. Do you think her role was crucial in your subsequent educational journey?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Yes, her role has been important in two regards. She, although illiterate herself, was very thoughtful with a critical mind. She asked questions, listened to the radio — there was no TV at that time in Afghanistan — engaged in conversations, and demanded good performance as far as school and university were concerned. Second, her love for Afghanistan. I remember she would always tell me not to forget Afghanistan.
Dr. Pirzada: What kind of impact did meeting your wife, Dr. Cheryl Benard, at the American University of Beirut have? You were coming from Afghanistan, one of the most conservative parts of the world, and there you came across a highly emancipated, left-of-centre American woman who divided her time and passions between the United States, Austria, and Germany. What kind of experience was that for an Afghan man?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I had come to America before then and had already experienced the Western style of interaction between men and women. I had been to an American high school in California and became aware of how different the interaction could be. One of the experiences that transformed my way of thinking was my time in California, where I lived with an American family who hosted and sponsored me. I lived with them for a whole year. The mother was the mother, the father was the father. We had many discussions about differences in lifestyle, values, and religion.
But Cheryl, I met in Beirut, and besides the personal attraction, I found her intellectually stimulating and brilliant. She was someone with whom I could develop a relationship and ultimately build a family. That was one of the lucky things. I was lucky with scholarships as well — to California, to Beirut, and to the University of Chicago. All luck, I think.
Dr. Pirzada: I agree that in terms of scholarships, you have been exceptionally lucky. But going back to your time at the American University of Beirut, there is a chapter that intrigued me — how you realised the conflict in the Muslim world. You saw the Muslim world split apart, driven by conflict, and you saw serious intellectual challenges to the Muslim mind. Do you think those challenges have been reduced, or have they multiplied?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I think the first intellectual crisis I had was when I came to America as a high school student. Seeing what Afghanistan was like when I left, the underdevelopment I described in my book, and then comparing it to America — the developed, advanced world — raised a question in my mind: what was wrong with us?
I tell the story of how my younger sister died after suffering in pain for days. I think she may have had appendicitis, but there was no doctor to take her to. Someone at a pharmacy occasionally looked at her. They didn’t even deal with her pain. And that stayed with me.
Seeing America, it really bothered me: was there something wrong with us? Were we less smart? Different kinds of human beings? Soon after starting school, I discovered that it wasn’t because we were less smart. I could understand what Americans were learning and did okay, despite the language barrier.
Dr. Pirzada: What did you conclude from that first interaction as a school kid in California? I remember reading in your book that you were shocked by the cultural difference.
Ambassador Khalilzad: Very much the cultural difference, the economic difference, the technological difference, and the standard of living. It was a different world. I felt that the issue was not intelligence but the way we lived was the problem, how we organised — or did not organise — ourselves, our political processes and systems.
I spent a great deal of time reading Tocqueville’s Democracy in America and exploring ideas about democracy in the United States—how Americans organize themselves, their spirit of volunteerism, initiative, problem-solving, and their intrinsic belief that every problem has a solution if one looks for it. I was also struck by how, as a young nation, America carried less of the weight of history. Although I initially wanted to become a medical doctor from an early age, this exposure led me instead to pursue the study of societies, politics, economics, and sociology.
Dr. Pirzada: So you made up your mind in California, during your exchange year?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Yes. My parents were against it. They wanted me to be a medical doctor, especially after my sister’s death. But when I went to Beirut, I had more freedom to choose, and I chose politics. It took a while for my parents to learn that.
Dr. Pirzada: Coming back to the American University of Beirut, you and Cheryl travelled extensively across the Middle East. You were troubled by the Palestinian and Iranian issues. You mentioned Iran’s oversized role in the region. But you also realised that Muslim political thought brings too much religion into it. What were your exact thoughts then?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I felt there was, in retrospect, an almost crisis of civilisation in the Islamic world. Muslims across the Middle East were asking: What went wrong? There was a period when Muslims were advancing educationally, contributing ideas, innovating, and making contributions to development. Then the decline set in, and the question became: what went wrong and what must be done? This crisis divided Muslims into at least 3-4 schools of thought.
One group said the reason Muslims were not as great as before is that they have lost their way. The path to greatness was to return to the origins — becoming Salafists, returning to fundamentals, and becoming good Muslims. Another group said we need to learn from those who are successful now, imitate what they do, and we need to do what they are doing now to succeed. The best example was Ataturk, who went so far as to change the alphabet, dress code, and holidays to emulate modernity.
In between, there were modernists, traditionalists, and mixes of the two. We never resolved this. This crisis continues and is ongoing in the current period. I think some aspects of it have become weaker, but some aspects are still as strong. Certainly, the unity of the Islamic and Arab world has declined; state nationalism has gained strength. Movements like the Muslim Brotherhood exist but are weaker. The Arab nationalism movement and Ba’athism are much weaker now.
Dr. Pirzada: Do you recollect that time period as an inspiring time period in the Arab world, in the Muslim world, in search of new ideas?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Yes, especially in Beirut. It was an epicentre because of press freedom and the influx of intellectuals from across the Arab world. Cafes were full of Arab intellectuals who would debate. Ba’athism had a strong following, and the Palestinian cause had support. Arab nationalism was a strong force intellectually, especially under Nasser. There were various efforts at uniting Arab states with each other into a United Arab Republic, which included Egypt, Syria, and even Iraq, but that has changed now.
And the fundamental crisis continues; just the elements that were stronger are weaker now. I also became a stronger believer in democracy, the rule of law, and equality before the law, regardless of religion, tribe, or gender, as the best way to organise society, develop, and compete. I felt that even minor examples like myself could succeed if those circumstances existed in Afghanistan or elsewhere.
Dr. Pirzada: Looking back at Ataturk, a century later, do you think the traditional Islamist Turkey under the AK Party is resurrecting itself? Has Kemalism failed?
Ambassador Khalilzad: From my perspective, the Kemalist project can be regarded as a success. It has established some rules of the game that have brought support, so that even Islamists operate within certain parameters. Frankly, if I could tell you, I used to say to AK leaders when I met President Gül or even President Erdoğan, especially in the context of Iraq, the Turks were very interested, so I would meet with them very frequently, that I wish our Islamists—in Afghanistan and Pakistan, places like that—were like you guys, because one could live with this kind of balance of religion, freedom, democracy, rule of law, and elections.
Yeah, there are still challenges, but these are better challenges to have than what the situation has been, even dealing with the military. The Turks have made enormous progress from TGS, the Turkish military-dominant system, where there were times that I used to go to Turkey, and they would take me from the airport, saying, “If you want to have a serious discussion, we’ll take you to the military headquarters. But if you want to be seen with the diplomats or political leaders, of course.”
Dr. Pirzada: Did you experience the same thing in Pindi and Islamabad?
Ambassador Khalilzad: It was made clear to me by very senior civilians, the most senior you can think of, that when it came to these issues I was interested in, “Don’t waste your time with me; you’d better go over there to Pindi.”
Dr. Pirzada: Oh my God. You actually experienced that—that you were told that these serious issues do not belong here in Islamabad.
Ambassador Khalilzad: Yeah, you know, let’s have dinner tonight. I’ve been friends with several Pakistanis, but I didn’t get to know Pakistan as well as I did in my last job, where I had to spend a lot of time there because the Taliban were there, and also the leadership. So I inevitably went and developed a relationship with Imran Khan and General Bajwa and others, and I got to know young Pakistanis and the society better, because my image of Pakistan was formed by growing up in Afghanistan, which was rather negative. I have to tell you that.
Dr. Pirzada: Why was it negative? Why is the Afghan perspective on Pakistan almost or mostly negative?
Ambassador Khalilzad: That is indeed unfortunate and remains a persistent issue in Afghan-Pakistan relations. In my judgment, it represents the Achilles’ heel of Afghanistan. It’s hurting Afghanistan more than it’s hurting Pakistan, although it has costs for Pakistan too. That is because of the history of imperial British influence in the region, in which some territory that was once part of Afghanistan was, under an agreement with Amir Abdul Rahman Khan of Afghanistan, for security reasons, taken over.
A contract was essentially signed for 100 years, stating that they would have security responsibilities. When the partition occurred after the British decision to leave, those territories became permanently part of Pakistan, and there was no agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on how to deal with this issue.
I believe that the issue of hostility toward Pakistan—voting against Pakistan in the UN, and running programs promoting independence or self-determination for the Pashtuns of Pakistan, which I even recall hearing on Afghan radio with daily evening news claiming this Pashtun region as theirs—needs to be addressed. Otherwise, the attitude toward Afghanistan will remain stagnant. A process to resolve this problem must begin, but it requires leaders in both countries with a clear mandate from their people—leaders who do not rely on this issue for political mobilization, but are committed to finding a solution.
Look at Europe—they’ve had territorial issues for centuries, many world problems were caused by them, and Afghanistan and Pakistan should learn from that. A path will be found, and it is one of my ambitions for what remains of my life to help with this.
Dr. Pirzada: It reminds me of an interview I had several years ago with President Hamid Karzai when he was visiting. I asked him about the Afghan position on the Durand Line. He said, “No Afghan government can publicly or politically afford to consent to the Durand Line.” I asked, “What is the solution?” He said, “Even the Taliban could not accept the Durand Line, but we are not creating any problem for you.” Do you think Afghanistan and Pakistan can overcome this historical British problem of the Durand Line?
Ambassador Khalilzad: There must be a solution; there simply must be. You need strong, good leaders with the backing of their people. I think Imran Khan could be such a leader. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, we’re still in search of a leader who could do that. This may be the American influence on me, but I believe that if there is a problem, there is a solution. You just need the wisdom and intellectual ability to see options and the determination to lead, not follow public opinion. No Afghan president can do this, which I completely disagree with.
Dr. Pirzada: You’ve interacted extensively with both Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai. You must be impressed?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I am disappointed with their performance, although they are both my friends. I went to school with Dr. Ghani. President Karzai and I used to have dinner five nights a week when I was ambassador, so much so that my embassy was in rebellion, saying they didn’t see me enough because I spent so much time with him. But they had other priorities, understandably. When America came in, there was almost nothing there. There were urgent issues: survival, food, and policing. But over time, for Afghanistan to work and for Pakistan not to face the potential of a two-front conflict, a solution had to emerge.
I see the future in regional cooperation, perhaps starting with economic and trade issues in western Pakistan. Central Asia has emerged after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan and Pakistan played a role in increasing the costs of occupation. Both took huge risks. These two countries, plus the five Central Asian countries, should become a single economic zone. That is ambitious, but achievable, for example, based on critical minerals, which they all are relatively rich in, just like the EU started with coal.
Dr. Pirzada: Since you mentioned Dr. Ghani and Hamid Karzai, I’m intrigued. Dr. Ghani appears in your book Envoy from the very beginning. He came from a very rich and elitist family and worked at the World Bank. Hamid Karzai appears later, when you became an ambassador. How do you compare the two men?
Ambassador Khalilzad: President Karzai was a great symbolic leader, open-armed to all Afghans, very good at interacting with people, but a poor state-builder. If he watches this, I hope he doesn’t mind me saying that. People retrospectively saw Zahir Shah’s period as a golden era. Karzai needed a strong Prime Minister to run institutions. They selected a presidential system after the US entered.
President Ghani was an intellectual, liked to read books, and discuss ideas, but he was somewhat out of touch with the realities of how to make progress and solve problems.
Dr. Pirzada: I saw an interview in which Ashraf Ghani said he was even suspicious that you were acting against him.
Ambassador Khalilzad: Quite a few Afghans who were dominant during the Republic era really liked me, including Ghani. We interacted frequently. But circumstances in the US changed regarding Afghanistan and Iraq, and politics shifted. People came to the judgment that things weren’t working as hoped. Initially, President Obama, and later more decisively by President Trump, who decided that the US should withdraw, acknowledged that terrorism from Afghanistan wasn’t as big a threat and that there was no military solution after 20 years. Afghans had to find their own solution. The US could help bring parties together, but we left with two basic requirements: one, no attacks on our forces during withdrawal; two, commitment by the government and Taliban that Afghanistan would not threaten the US or its allies. There was a belief that Afghanistan, when you leave it, that’s when they get you, so to speak. The British withdrawal. One of them was very bloody. The Soviet withdrawal has been bloody. We didn’t want that in America.
There was some strong logic to the approach: the withdrawal wouldn’t happen unless there was an agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban, which would give the government leverage. Since the Taliban wanted the U.S. to withdraw, they would need to agree favorable to the Afghan government. The U.S. presence could help secure a better deal, and the plan was that we wouldn’t leave unless such an agreement was in place. The Taliban would have to agree to terms such as President Ghani staying in power and the Taliban joining the government. Putting my personal views aside, the U.S. thought this could become a recipe for never actually leaving, because the government and the Taliban would both demand concessions, and Afghans might never reach an agreement, ultimately defeating the purpose of the withdrawal.
Dr. Pirzada: Was this Trump’s view?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Ultimately, yes. The military and political establishment in the US did not favor withdrawal. They wanted the war to continue, hoping to succeed eventually. They couldn’t persuade the President that there was a path where, if we stayed for two, three, or even four more years, we could achieve a victory—defined in a way that seemed plausible—especially given the changes in the world, including the rise of China, shifts in great power relations, and evolving economic issues at home- made Afghanistan less of a priority. The lesson is that time has to be factored into doing things such as Afghanistan or Iraq, that there isn’t an indefinite amount of time. Technology also made a long-term military presence less necessary in Afghanistan, less consequential because now we were capable with drones and longer range systems to hit targets relatively precisely by being able to loiter on targets and then have some system controlled by someone shoot at the target.
If we had that capability before 9/11, I’m definite that we would have killed Osama because we knew before 9/11 where he was approximately in Afghanistan and his team. But by the time we send him a rocket, it would take hours, and he would not be there anymore where he was.
Dr. Pirzada: Osama bin Laden was found near Abbottabad. Was this an arrangement between Pakistanis or Saudis, or was he hiding in plain sight?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I was critical because one reason the insurgency wasn’t defeated promptly was that it had a safe sanctuary in Pakistan. I publicly spoke about this, even though it angered some Pakistani friends. I argued that ignoring this would become a major problem.
Dr. Pirzada: You mentioned this in your book. What about your interaction with General Musharraf?
Ambassador Khalilzad:
When I complained extensively, Secretary Powell called me and essentially reprimanded me, saying I shouldn’t speak publicly about this issue. There was no proof that President Musharraf was directly behind all of it. Powell personally called me—he was, in a sense, my boss as Ambassador, since you report to the Secretary of State—and asked me, “Please don’t say this.”
I knew Secretary Powell from our time at the Pentagon during the Gulf War, so I could be somewhat informal with him. I told him, “Look, I’m not making this up. Do you think I am?” Every morning, intelligence personnel brief me and bring documents. I approach these rigorously—I read them carefully, ask for raw materials, and want to form my own judgment. I said, “Bring me the books. Show me where you collected this. What does the report say? Am I reading something different? Are they briefing me differently than they brief you?” It couldn’t be.
I explained, “Either we need to find a solution to this problem, Mr. Secretary, or I won’t stop talking about it. I have a responsibility. I was sent by the President to make Afghanistan succeed, and I cannot do that if a sanctuary is being developed.”
Two weeks later, Powell called again. He said he had discussed it with President Bush, and they both agreed I should not speak publicly about the matter. I knew President Bush personally, having worked for him before my posting to Afghanistan, and I had high regard for him. In an NSC meeting, with him in the chair, he asked me, “I hear you have some issue with Pakistan. General Musharraf is a good guy and has been very helpful.”
I responded, “Mr. President, I don’t disagree that he has been helpful. We overfly Pakistani territory, bring supplies through Pakistan, and they have acted against terrorists. The President of Pakistan faces significant challenges in this regard. But there is another part—for whatever reason, maybe he thinks we will not stay forever or will abandon Afghanistan again—he is supporting this. He is a military man; if he were a civilian who had been elected, I might not believe it. Even civilian friends tell me, ‘Don’t worry, don’t waste your time talking to me about this.’ But I know the reality on the ground in Rawalpindi.
Dr. Pirzada: What intrigues me is this: as the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, you must have been receiving briefings from the military and intelligence. But what was the nature of those briefings? It seems the White House and the Secretary of State were either not fully convinced or preferred to ignore the issue.
Ambassador Khalilzad: What it really was is that they didn’t get into the nitty-gritty details. Part of the reason was that the priority at the time was Al Qaeda and Pakistan’s role in addressing that threat. When you have a mindset that says, “We need Pakistan to handle this challenge,” other issues tend to get less attention. I had also mentioned the supply issues—overflying Pakistan, bringing supplies through the country, since Afghanistan is landlocked—and they weren’t that focused on it.
By consistently asserting this, I was able to make them focus on the issue. Then the President told me, “I’m going to do something for you. I’m going to call General Musharraf and say you’re coming to see him. You will argue with him, discuss all these issues, and I will tell him that I am sending you.”
I told the President, “I think this is not very wise. I’m very unpopular in Pakistan right now because I speak openly about the sanctuary issue. Maybe someone else should go.”
But he insisted, “No, no, no. I want you to go. Musharraf is a good man—a great man. He will receive you well.”
I went to see General Musharraf. I took the ambassador in Pakistan, intelligence, military—the huge delegation. General Musharraf was extremely kind. He received me, was at the door waiting. I was very honored. He was very polite, saying, “This is your second home. I know Afghanistan is in a difficult situation. You should come in and spend weekends here,” and so on. Very, very polite.
I said to him, “Mr. President, I have been sent to solve a problem, and I want to know: the problem is that I should solve it. You are our friend. Pakistan is our friend. Afghanistan is now our friend, and you, too, don’t get along. The President has asked me—it’s your job to solve this problem—so that these two friends, Karzai and President Musharraf, get along. That’s why I’m here. I’m here to ask you, what is your problem with Afghanistan?” And so the discussion started. We could talk a long time about that.
Dr. Pirzada: I want to cover so much ground. So follow the assignments: key assignments as ambassador to Afghanistan, ambassador to Iraq, ambassador to the United Nations, and then Doha. You know the deal? What was the most difficult assignment of your career?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I think it’s a close call between Iraq and Doha. Iraq was very challenging—we talked about the crisis of civilizations earlier—but this was an additional dimension that was very new to me. I have to admit that a huge sectarian tension between Shia and Sunni Arabs, and I found that very challenging: getting Iraqis to take advantage of the opportunity of a dictatorship having been overthrown. Our expectation, President Bush’s vision, was: you take the dictator away, people will pursue their self-interest and come together pragmatically. How do we organize ourselves for success?
What it became was much more score-settling, revenge, and marginalizing. I worked extremely hard, and at that time, it was very frustrating to deal with. In the case of Doha, it was heartbreaking.
Dr. Pirzada: In the 1960s, you were at the American University of Beirut, right?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I went there in the 1970s.
Dr. Pirzada: So, in the 1970s, when you were there, this region aspired to secular government. Young intellectuals were gathering in Syria, and Lebanon was a very secular place. At that time, one could hardly have imagined the kind of civil war that later erupted. As Nassim Nicholas Taleb explains in The Black Swan, no one anticipated such an outcome. Likewise, no one expected the sectarian conflicts that broke out in Lebanon, or the turmoil that spread into Syria and Iraq, both then under Ba’athist rule. Even Iran, under the Shah in the 1970s, had a very secular government. What went wrong in this region
Ambassador Khalilzad: I think these regimes did not deliver. We could have a long discussion about the failure of the Shah’s regime.
Dr. Pirzada: Deliver in what respect? Socioeconomic transformation?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Economic performance and maintaining the support of the people. In the case of Iran, for example, the Islamic revolution occurred based on a particular interpretation of Twelver Shiite beliefs: that the 12th Imam has disappeared and will return one day. In the meantime, the vicegerent who should govern would be a religious scholar. That empowered a lot of Shia religious movements.
In Afghanistan, with the Soviet invasion, we thought the Soviets would stay forever. When a neighboring country became Marxist-Leninist, it seemed a one-way highway—they would do whatever was necessary to win. So we supported Sunni Afghan religious leaders, in cooperation with the ISI and the Chinese, even bringing some Arab Islamists to fight, believing that they would fight the hardest and that Soviet withdrawal would solve the problem. The objective was to make the Soviet occupation as costly and painful as possible.
Once they left, the Islamic influence spread in Afghanistan and Iran. This also had implications for Lebanon, Shias in Iraq, Islamist movements, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, particularly in Syria, Jordan, and Israel. Lebanon, a weak state, couldn’t protect itself against superior powers and became a battlefield, ultimately leading to civil war.
Dr. Pirzada: In the 1980s, you were part of the Reagan administration, handling Afghan issues. You arranged meetings between President Reagan and the Afghan mujahideen. In hindsight, do you feel supporting these hardline Islamists sowed seeds for future problems in Afghanistan?
Ambassador Khalilzad: No doubt. The Taliban are kind of the successors, the children and grandchildren, of the Islamist forces we supported. Some were members, or their fathers were members, of those parties—three Islamist parties and three more moderate ones. Once the Soviets withdrew, we thought the problem was solved. But had we engaged Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal with a transition arrangement or political settlement, maybe we could have avoided the vacuum that led to civil war and ultimately the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan.
Dr. Pirzada: Was the Doha process very painful for you as an ambassador? When I read Envoy, you borrowed the terms of Francis Fukuyama, and thought that was the end of history for Afghanistan, imagining a multi-party democratic Afghanistan with human rights, women’s rights, education, and employment. This is what you were trying to build up with the most powerful military machine in the world, but then handing over the same country back to the Taliban 40 years down the line. Was that a sense of surrender and failure painful?
Ambassador Khalilzad: It was a very difficult situation because I had tried to defeat the Taliban and establish a democratic Afghanistan in alliance with the West. I had been there as presidential envoy for Afghanistan after 9/11. But then I went as ambassador, and many things were going very positively, surprisingly positively, so much so that when I was sent to Iraq from Afghanistan, President Bush said, “Zal, your mission in Afghanistan was very successful. Well done, I want you to do the same in Iraq.” Afghanistan was seen as a success, going back after many years with a worsening situation, the war not going well, people being unhappy because of security problems, corruption, difficulties in services, ethnic tensions, and tribal tensions. It was sad, but I told you my mission as described was to get us out safely and get the Afghans to talk to each other, and get the terrorism commitment.
Now, the Doha agreement did all that. There was a Taliban commitment not to attack the withdrawing forces, the Afghan government. There was a commitment to terrorism in black and white by the Taliban and by the government. We had two agreements. We met the challenge that the Afghans have to meet. But as I had said before is should we have made withdrawal conditional on an agreement? Some of us favored that. I could understand the president’s point of view. This was ultimately President Biden, who thought we should stay until they agree.
The President asked, How long do you think it will take for them to agree? Can you set a time? And I said, “No, I can’t set a time. You know, it’s not under our control. They have to get along. Could it be a few years? Yes, it could be. Could it be that they don’t reach an agreement? Yes, it’s possible.
Dr. Pirzada: President Biden said that?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Biden said that the withdrawal would not be made conditional on the Afghans reaching an agreement among themselves, because they might not. Meanwhile, I was on the ground, and the war essentially continued. The Taliban had agreed that during the withdrawal, once an agreement was signed between the U.S. and them, they would not attack U.S. forces.
There was a timetable of 14 months that we had agreed upon, which Biden later extended unilaterally. The Taliban adhered to the agreement’s terms—they did not attack U.S. forces, though they accepted that we could attack them if necessary. If they attacked Afghan forces while we were still present, we might have had to return to combat. All of this depended on whether the Afghans could reach an agreement among themselves in a timely manner.
Dr. Pirzada: Coming to Imran Khan. How many times have you met him, and what kind of person do you find him?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I met Imran Khan many times. Intelligence and military people sometimes asked me, “Why do you see him all the time?” But he was always very kind. We had good, solid discussions. I appreciated his dedication. He is a real patriot of Pakistan. He could have stayed in London and lived a grand life, but he returned home to work with his people, building hospitals and taking risks. Pakistan should treasure someone like that.
Meeting him also made me more positive about Pakistanis. I met young entrepreneurs, had dinners with them—they are very capable people. Pakistan could be a major power economically and otherwise. Let the people lead, and let them choose freely.
Dr. Pirzada: Interaction with Imran Khan changed your perspective on the Pakistani people?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Yes. Meeting him and young Pakistanis and seeing their potential was eye-opening.
Dr. Pirzada: How was Imran Khan helpful in the Doha process?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Very supportive. He argued that the only way out for Afghanistan is a political solution, not a military solution. I told him that’s what we were advocating as well. He was aligned with our goals.
Dr Pirzada: You’re aware that Imran’s critics call him “Taliban Khan” for saying there is no military solution.
Ambassador Khalilzad: But these critics were supporting the Taliban, arming and training them. I never took that seriously.
Dr. Pirzada: You went ballistic in support of Imran Khan over the past years, posting detailed tweets. You angered the Pakistani generals, GHQ. You were very critical of General Munir. But you have stopped talking about Imran Khan following General Asim Munir’s meeting with POTUS in June. Have you lost hope in Imran Khan in Pakistan?
Ambassador Khalilzad: No. I have not changed my view. I’ve even tweeted recently, ‘Free Imran Khan’. You have to wait for an opportunity. I can appreciate people who are worried about Imran Khan.
I have not changed my view. I am a free person, uh I I don’t take instructions, or some Pakistanis have accused me of being a lobbyist for Imran. No, I have no financial relations with anyone in Pakistan or Imran Khan or his family, or his party. I support his release because I fear for Pakistan. The military may feel confident now because of its war with India, but the daily lives of people, their freedom, and their right to choose leadership are permanent. I fear a meltdown. These are all trumped-up charges against Imran Khan. There’s not a lot independent judiciary looking at things.
Pakistani military has sometimes sent messages that if he would only admit that or apologize for attacking the military facilities, something that he denies that he had a hand in or ordered anything like that. But the solution is freedom for Imran Khan. My position is about the rule of law, dialogue, and democratic elections.
Pakistanis are capable of running their own affairs if the rules are followed. Pakistanis are, in my judgment, having met many of them, having friends among them, they are very capable of running their own affairs if the rules are followed, and that will save Pakistan. Right now, you see the problem of terrorism, the problem of insurgency, a very fragile economy, and dependent on foreign handouts that shouldn’t be Pakistan in my view
Dr. Pirzada: Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad, you chose not to study medicine, instead pursuing history, philosophy, law, and sociology. You have been a diplomat and an academic. When you say you fear for Pakistan, what are your fears?
Ambassador Khalilzad: Well, I fear a meltdown. I fear increased violence, and the military says that they will control it, but the control is democracy and rule of law, and respecting people’s rights is a better way to control than warfare. Warfare can solve an immediate threat or challenge, but the underlying conditions will propel reorganization and going at it again. I worry about that in Pakistan. I worry about talent leaving Pakistan because of the challenges, or talent that can’t feel safe going back from abroad..
I believe that Pakistan is so important—250 million people, strategically located, with nuclear weapons, although that is a permanent condition to have nuclear weapons. But in combination with that, it’s a challenge for the world. If Pakistan, God forbid, fails, and you have a meltdown. I wish Pakistan well. I want it to succeed. I have no other desire than that.
It’s my judgment on two fronts that I feel strongly about: a better relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and a Central Asia that is economically moving towards integration, connectivity, which provides strategic depth in many ways; and two, a democratic Pakistan. I believe strongly that Pakistanis are capable of running their own affairs. Leaders cannot be selected by some cabal within uniformed ranks. People must decide based on their programs, their personalities, their history, and the vision they have. Imran Khan, I’m sure, has learned—or should have learned—from running the government the last time, where there were issues with people and organizational challenges. But ultimately, the voters decide: who do they trust with their future?
Dr. Pirzada: Many Pakistanis, especially the Pakistani-American diaspora and Pakistanis around the world, had enlisted in the political process. They were hopeful that with the change of guard in the White House, under President Donald Trump, especially since you were close to the Republican Party and Richard Grenell was taking a position—many other congressmen were also involved—they thought the White House under Trump would persuade the Pakistani military for political reconciliation, the release of Imran Khan, and jump-start the democratic process.
But Donald Trump embraced General Asim Munir—an unprecedented lunch or meeting with a serving military general, which hasn’t really happened in contemporary times. So what has changed with this Indo-Pakistani war of four days? Donald Trump has appreciated Pakistani leaders. If you wear your academic and diplomatic heart, what has changed?
Ambassador Khalilzad: I have to tell you, I don’t know for sure. There may be some immediate issues affecting the calculation. I know from my previous service in the Trump administration that the President had very warm regards for Imran Khan. They had known each other before either became politically active. He repeatedly asked during that period about having Imran Khan visit. It was a very warm visit—not only meetings in the White House, but a tour of the family quarters, which rarely happens. His wife participated, although Imran Khan didn’t have his spouse with him. The feeling and the history are there.
What are the current circumstances that caused this conflict? Obviously, something very important happened. But I believe Pakistanis—first and foremost—have the responsibility to deal with their own problems. They shouldn’t look primarily to America or a foreign power to change their internal circumstances. The general tendency of America right now is not to get entangled in internal affairs too much because of the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. That tendency is there. Pakistanis, after recognizing this, often complain to me: “What is Trump going to do to solve our problems?” They have to solve their own problems.
They should not lose hope. They should not lose determination. It’s about their lives and their future more than America’s interest alone. Perhaps General Munir has offered positive measures in terms of dealing with U.S. interests, but I think Pakistanis shouldn’t expect everything from the United States.
Dr. Pirzada: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, it has been a rare treat talking to you and listening to you. I hope I will have good feedback, and I hope that we can talk again. There are so many issues I had written down that I haven’t been able to raise. Thank you so much. I look forward to continuing this conversation.
Ambassador Khalilzad: I send my regards to all your many, many viewers, friends, and admirers who will be watching. I thank you for this opportunity, and I wish you all the best.
Dr. Pirzada: Thank you, Ambassador. Thank you once again.