In this powerful conversation, Editor GVS Dr. Moeed Pirzada engages Ambassador Omar Samad, a distinguished Afghan diplomat and former ambassador to France and Canada, currently a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center in Washington, D.C. With decades of experience navigating Afghanistan’s foreign policy and its turbulent ties with Pakistan, Samad offers an insider’s perspective on the deepening rift between Islamabad and Kabul.
As Pakistan’s air and drone strikes inside Afghanistan trigger global concern and the Istanbul peace talks collapse despite mediation by Qatar and Turkey, both nations stand at a dangerous crossroads. Ambassador Samad unpacks the historical mistrust, the TTP dilemma, India’s growing influence in Kabul, and the shifting regional power matrix — revealing the complex web of diplomacy, security, and geopolitics now shaping South Asia’s most volatile relationship.
Title: Moeed Pirzada with Afghan Diplomat, Omar Samad: Trump Never Wanted Taliban to Rule Kabul? What Next
Date: 29th October 2025
Dr. Moeed Pirzada: Assalam-o-alaikum, This is Moeed Pirzada in Washington, United States. Joining me today in the session is Ambassador Omar Samad. I want to understand from him what is going on between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the deadlock from Doha to Istanbul in the talks about which we are continuously hearing.
A few words about Ambassador Omar Samad. Ambassador Omar Samad has served as Afghanistan’s ambassador to Canada and France. In the last 20 years, he has served at various levels, executive and advisory positions with the government of Afghanistan, with the United States think tanks, and he’s currently a senior non-resident fellow with the Atlantic Council, the South Asia Center in Washington, DC, United States. Ambassador Omar Samad, a very warm welcome to you on such short notice. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Omar Asad: Assalam alalayikum, Mr. Moeed Pirzada. Very nice to be with you. This is not our first interaction, but I look forward to this discussion today on a day that happened to be somewhat important for both countries. I think a very troubling development is coming from Istanbul that, after 3 days of sustained discussions on the first day on Saturday, Pakistanis and Afghans with the help of the Turkish mediators sat down for 15 continuous hours on Sunday, they were again meeting for nine continuous hours, and again on Monday the whole day they have been battling each other, but they have not been able to reach any conclusion.
Dr. Pirzada: What is your information and understanding about this process?
Ambassador Samad: It’s a good question! We do not have accurate, verifiable data and information that has come out of the meetings for the last three and a half days, as you mentioned. I am one of those who like to deal with reality, anything that is factual.
So what I can tell you, from what we think is credible, is that both sides obviously came here, as you mentioned, as a result of the Qatari-Turkish mediation that took place in Doha last week, and there was an agreement to have a ceasefire that has lasted thus far, and hopefully, Inshallah, it will last longer.
But we are not sure after Istanbul. But going into Istanbul, mediated sessions with Turkey and Qatar still on site, I think that what we saw was a willingness to talk, first of all, about fighting, and also a willingness to address certain issues.
Now, there are different types of issues that Afghans and Pakistanis have had over the years. I have been part of several rounds of discussions. I’ve been part of state delegations to Pakistan. We have received Pakistanis. I was a member of the trilateral, the tripartite Commission between the United States, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in the early years. So we’re all very familiar with how these things take shape.
Dr. Pirzada: Since you have been working at multiple levels, in both advisory and executive levels, and you say there have been issues we have been debating. Can you tell our viewers what the key issues are that always divide Afghanistan and Pakistan from each other?
Ambassador Samad: So usually, there are immediate concerns, immediate incidents that happen, that have a security aspect to them. So one side sees a threat or feels that the other side is not doing enough, and that there is some kind of element that needs to be neutralized, or somebody needs to be punished, or somebody needs to be sent a message. Usually, that happens. Afghans are mostly in the defensive side, I won’t say always, but in most cases, if you look back at the record, at least over the last 25 years or so, we can go back Moeed all the way to 1947 48 unfortunately, at that point after partition, the two countries got off on the wrong footing, let’s say, and some of that was actually misunderstanding.
For example, the issue of Pakistani recognition at the United Nations, which the Afghans did not vote for. I know for a fact because I come from a diplomatic family. I’ve read the documents, I’ve talked to people who were involved in the past, and that was not a deliberate attempt. It was miscommunication between Kabul, its Embassy in London, and its embassy and mission at the United Nations, that at the time, you know, communications were somewhat very weak and not as sophisticated as now. And so the message did not reach New York on time, and the decision was taken abruptly by someone in the hierarchy. So this is a new historical fact. I’ve mentioned this in the past.
Dr. Pirzada: Very, very interesting. So what was the message that was communicated from London that didn’t reach in time?
Ambassador Samad: So, when the vote was coming up our ambassador in the UN asked our ambassador in London to tell him what Kabul wants, because it was coming through London, and Kabul did not respond on time, and the ambassador in London informed New York to say to give a negative vote, he thought that is what Kabul would be saying. A day or two later, the actual Kabul response came and said, Do not vote against, just, you know, take a neutral position and do not vote for, and change it if you have made a mistake.
Dr. Pirzada: Kabul wanted the mission in the UN to abstain from the vote?
Ambassador Samad: They wanted to abstain from the vote; that is the historical record on the Afghan side.
Dr.Pirzada: What was the issue? What cast? Why did they want to abstain? What was the issue? What was the issue?
Ambassador Samad: The issue had to do with the colonial legacy and what we call the Durand line, and the fact that Afghans had been told, the Afghan government had been told that one option is for the tribal regions to decide for themselves as to what they wanted to do, not that Afghanistan had any claims at the time. It was just a question of making sure that there is some level of, you know, self-rule. If that was what the people wanted, they wanted it to be a more democratic process. But partition, obviously, what the British left behind is something that, not only in Afghanistan, in the Pakistan case, but in many other parts of the world, has become problematic.
Dr. Pirzada: You use the term self-rule, which is a very important political term. Self-rule for what? The erstwhile FATA areas, which are now part of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.?
Ambassador Samad: I would say that self-determination, before anything, is people, right? people in those regions, because an agreement had been signed in 1893, which basically created a de facto boundary. The de facto boundary had never been recognized, and when the British were leaving Pakistan, it was created, of course, as part of partition, and then Afghanistan felt it was left with the FATA complete. And so they wanted to they one of the options was, why don’t we ask the people of the region what they want? And they can decide. But that never happened, but over the years, Pakistan,
Dr. Pirzada: I want to understand this, because a very senior Pakistani military officer who is himself Pashtun from, probably from Tank or somewhere, he was once mentioning to me that the junior, and he’s, he’s a great, I mean, in the sense that he’s very history buff. So he said that the Durand Line was drawn at the request of the Afghan rulers. I mean, they requested Mortimer Durand. I mean, he was invited on their invitation. So it’s not that the Durand line in 1893 was necessarily a British colonial imposition,
Ambassador Samad: But our version of history is a bit different. Our version of history, and the documentation that we have at the foreign ministry or state archives, shows that it was somewhat imposed. I mean, I don’t think that at the time, the king of Afghanistan, or the ruler of Afghanistan, could have asked the British or told the British, or instructed the British to do this, or that the British were basically the lords of the day, and they decided what suited them and their security. So the Durand Line was basically drawn as a result of a security issue that the British felt, not only in terms of their own forces, but in terms of what was happening north of Afghanistan with Czarist Russia that was moving in.
So the decision was made by the British to create a buffer, buffer zone, and Afghanistan’s line was drawn in order to turn Afghanistan into a buffer zone between the two empires instead of clashing. So that’s our version of history. But if you don’t mind, you know history, we can talk about this for days on end, and may or may not agree, because of what happened or not.
Dr. Pirzada: I just wanted to basically expand on it a bit, because many Pakistanis think that the and even whenever, whenever the Afghans are upset, like they are for the past, you know, three weeks or four weeks, they keep on, start saying that, you know, all Pakistan up to attack, up to the river Indus, from where the Punjab starts. It basically belongs to Afghanistan. This is all disputed. So now you’re saying, you know, this is just a misunderstanding.
Ambassador Samad: I think that we need to come to terms with what is reasonable, what is acceptable, in what is realistic in today’s world. You know, this is 78 years after partition. This is 130-something years after the Durand Line agreement was signed. So I don’t think you can rewrite history or revise it in such a way that would hurt both of us, and would hurt the potential that both countries have in terms of people-to-people, economic ties, integration, and making sure that we have access to Central Asia, to the Indian Ocean, all of that.
So there is a lot that we have that we can work on, instead of things that we cannot resolve immediately, but at the same time, we have to be cognizant of the fact that we didn’t hurt a colonial legacy, and we did. We had to deal with it in some ways, but over time, now, I think that what we need to do is look at the more immediate, both opportunities as well as threats that exist, and come up with mechanisms and come up with solutions that work for both sides. And I think this is why it was a bit disappointing to see that the talks in Istanbul today floundered. There was no result.
So there are three options now left, in my opinion, Moeed, if I may. Number one is. Somewhat the status quo of a ceasefire exists, we will take it one day at a time and see what happens, and hope that nothing will disrupt this status quo.
Number two is that, well, we were very upset we didn’t get what we wanted, and now we’re going to resort back to kinetics, and we’re going to take the military route.
Dr. Pirzada: Pakistan’s defense minister hinted on Sunday evening?
Ambassador Samad: Unfortunately, that minister who’s known to be making some type, you know, these types of claims and allegations at times, did mention that, I think that it was unfortunate. But today, very interestingly, the minister of interior of Pakistan, who’s visiting Tehran as part of a meeting, went in front of the cameras. I don’t know if you saw it.
Dr. Pirzada: I saw that. I saw that he actually met the Deputy Interior Minister of Afghanistan.
Ambassador Samad: Yes, greeted the deputy and Chairman of the Taliban regime and government, and held his hand and said, “Well, you know, we are all part of, you know. We’re all part of a family. These things happen within a family, and we will resolve it as members of a family do”. So, a very different tone after Istanbul crashed, a very different tone coming from the Minister of the Interior. Maybe he’s more diplomatic than the minister of defense, I don’t know.
Dr.Pirzada: More informed as well, perhaps because he’s closer to the Pakistan Army Chief.
Ambassador Samad: Well, you know, that is the spirit that is needed, and I’m speaking as a next diplomat. That is the spirit that is needed in order to move in the right direction. And that means, as I was saying, the third option, obviously.
The second option is we go to kinetics. The third option is that we actually postpone and prolong this process. We take a break, and we come back to the table, and we continue the discussions in the talks, and we pinpoint the areas that need focus, and we come up with small steps. You know, what is lacking, as you know very well, is trust- number one. There we have other things that are lacking too, but to rebuild trust between two nations, two governments, I don’t think the nations have a problem. Actually, I think it’s mostly a government-to-government problem. It’s a system-to-system problem.
It’s an establishment versus establishment problem. And then other elements between us are also playing a role. So some of them or spoilers, some of them can help. Some of them are opportunistic. Some of them can really create an environment that is either conducive to peace or conducive to war.
So motivations behind the scenes also play a role in this context, because both Afghanistan and Pakistan are very much tied to a region where there’s India, China, Russia, Central Asia, Iran, and then you have the great powers who are competing against each other. And this part of the world is one of the focuses for competition between, let’s say, China.
Dr. Pirzada: When you talk of the motivations, I’ve tried researching and finding out who initiated the Doha process between Pakistan and Afghanistan on the 17th, 18th, and 19th of October? Who went to Doha? Who asked Doha and Istanbul to mediate between Pakistan and Afghanistan?
Ambassador Samad: I don’t think that you will have an accurate answer, because one side said, says that the other side did it, and the other side says, No, they did it. Now it’s there’s a third possibility that a third side may have indicated somehow or used a diplomatic messaging system to say, you guys need to stop, and you need to go and talk. That’s possible too. So, regardless, we are beyond that point now.
Dr. Pirzada: So, what is the actual issue? As you understand, because Pakistan demands that Afghanistan, I think the last demand, which I’ve read in the Pakistani papers, also the Afghan side, is that the Pakistani side wants the Afghan Taliban to declare TTP as a terrorist organization, just like Pakistan and the United States have done, and then to fight it, and then to exterminate it. And this is an eventuality for which the Afghan Taliban and their defense minister, Maulvi Mohamed Yaqoob, are not ready.
Ambassador Samad: Well, again, we don’t have the exact list of demands, and we do not have the exact content of the discussions that took place. But we can assume from what has been said indirectly that yes, TTP and the threat that Pakistan feels about the TTP and militancy are the main issues.
But the Afghans also have their own concerns. There is something called Daesh, which is also called Islamic State, Khorasan, which now, from all indications, is situated in Balochistan. It has networks in Baluchistan. Now, this is the outfit there used to be inside Afghanistan was functioning across Afghanistan, was a spoiler in Afghanistan, and was pushed out of Afghanistan by the Taliban over the last four years.
So there are claims, counterclaims, demands, and expectations from both sides. Security is number one. Obviously, the agenda can be a very broad agenda, but right now, I think that’s where it’s starting. I don’t know if this is a good way to initiate these types of talks. Do you need other types of Confidence Building Measures first? Do we need to talk about soft issues first, or do we need to start somewhere else and then move to these controversial issues? I am not going to play devil’s advocate or try to lecture others, but I think that the Turks and the Qataris are very well versed in all of this. They are professionals, and they mean well. And I think that the approach and this context may be the right approach. It’s just that the two sides seem to be stuck to their gun, sticking to their guns, and sticking to a very narrow narrative and a very narrow agenda of demands
Dr. Pirzada: Before the withdrawal of the US forces, the common Pakistani perspective and narrative about ISIS Khorasan was that it was an outfit of some Western agency which is actually being used against the Afghan Taliban within Afghanistan. Now Afghan Taliban are accusing ISIS-Khorasan is in Pakistan. What is your understanding? What is ISIS Khorassan? I mean, ISIS Khorasan, to begin with, was basically a Middle Eastern militant or terrorist.
Ambassador Samad: Well, the Islamic State was Middle Eastern, you know. And ISIS is, of course, the acronym that is used for ISIL in the Middle East. But then an offshoot emerged, around 2013 14 in our region, we don’t actually know much, but there are a bunch of dissatisfied jihadists, radical jihadists, but at the same time, there are all kinds of allegations about their roots and the motivations behind this group. They have been very destructive. They have been used, or they are carrying out very extreme measures of fighting state elements.
Dr. Pirzada: What do they want?
Ambassador Samad: They claim that they want the caliphate. Now, if that’s the case, I’m not sure how it works. You know? What I can tell you is that since their presence in the Afghan-Pakistani region, what we have recognized in Afghanistan is that their mentality, their ideology, their agenda, their program is not very well welcomed by the Afghans. It doesn’t suit the Afghan mindset. It doesn’t suit the Afghan psyche, and it’s in a clash.
That’s why the Taliban even had major problems with them, and they had to kick them out of Afghanistan. Now, how are they being restructured? How are they being used in Pakistan? Who is using them? Are they? Are they just in no man’s land? Is it ungoverned spaces, or is there some other connection somewhere else? We don’t really know enough, but we do know there is evidence that they are in Baluchistan now, and they are a threat, not only to Afghanistan, but they can be a threat to Iran. They can be a threat to Central Asia. They can be a threat to China and maybe to Pakistan itself.
So what is Pakistan doing about that? It is also a question that was raised in Istanbul.
Dr. Pirzada: The Pakistani Government is continuously accusing the Afghan Taliban in Kabul is sponsoring, supporting, helping, and using TTP as a tool against Pakistan. Many other Pakistani analysts also believe the same. So what do you think I mean? Is TTP just being there in Afghanistan, or are the Afghan Taliban actually using TTP as a tool against the state of Pakistan? No,
Ambassador Samad: I don’t see a reason for or a logic for the Afghan Taliban, given their isolation from the world, given the fact that they’re under sanctions, given the fact that they have a lot of problems at home, that they would engage in such adventurism. Yes, we do know that they were sort of like distant cousins, and that they have helped each other along the way, and that, let’s look at how the TTP was formed.
I mean, you’re probably in Pakistan; people probably know much more about it than I do. They teach under an umbrella for a variety of anti-state militant groups, and they have gone through several leadership changes because their agenda is against the military establishment in Pakistan; they would like to see some changes in the tribal regions. They would like to see more autonomy. Maybe I don’t know exactly what they are asking, because it’s confusing, but it’s a pocket from an Afghan perspective. It’s a Pakistani issue, and Pakistan has to deal with it, and we, I think, Afghans, even in the past, even under the Republic, have offered any type of help or mediation between the government in Pakistan and the TTP, if there’s any way we can help, I think that even the Taliban have said so on many occasions, they would be willing to do so.
But what happened is that 1000s of families were pushed out as well. So you have 1000s of civilians who, as a result of the military campaigns that we pushed into Afghanistan, and every time that there’s something happens, they are targeted, as well as Afghan civilians. So the killing of civilians, whether it’s from our side or the Pakistani side, has to stop. Maybe this is where they need to start this discussion.
Dr. Pirzada: So, are you suggesting this thing that even before Kabul, Kabul was taken by the Taliban? TTP was an issue that was discussed between the previous Afghan regime, like Ashraf Ghani, and Pakistan. TTP was an issue.
Ambassador Samad: TTP was an ally, more or less, of the Afghan Taliban, but Pakistan did not have any issues with that. It is, you know, it’s ironic that the same scenario is in reverse mode. Now the Pakistani government is complaining about the fact that the Afghans, or the Afghan Taliban de facto government, is in cohort with the TTP in some ways, or given some type of support, or not doing what is necessary to stop them, whereas it’s their own responsibility, first and foremost, of course, to do whatever is necessary within Pakistan to address these grievances. Maybe they have some grievances that they need to discuss. But, you know, this blame game, I think, is very dangerous, because then there’s the new allegation now that India is also involved in this, and that the new relationship between New Delhi and Kabul is also encouraging the TTP in some ways, or that money is flowing somehow.
But you know, these are all allegations that need proof and evidence, and one of the things that I am looking for, instead of resorting to blame games. If I’m at the table, I would like to see evidence and facts that are undeniable and verifiable and that will help us address the core of the issue.
Dr. Pirzada: But wasn’t the Verification Mechanism to be decided in the form of a committee in Istanbul? It was about the same thing, that if there are allegations of cross-border terrorism, then Pakistan should bring the evidence, and the committee should examine if this is cross-border terrorism or if this is an internal terrorism, and Istanbul is supposed to have a specialization because of its widespread experiences with the PKK, which was operating from bases within Iraq and Syria. So, but then it changed.
I think now the Pakistani demand is that the Afghan Taliban should actually fight against them should declare the TTP as a terrorist entity, and basically, basically, fight against them. Why the Afghan Taliban are not ready to throw out the TTP from Afghanistan?
Ambassador Samad: Well, I mean, I think that what, from what I heard, the first day or two were spent discussing semantics and terms and the definition of terms and the words that are being used. You know, what is a terrorist? What is not a terror? What is a militant? What is a state actor? It was a non-state actor, so they spent a lot of time discussing these issues as well, from what we hear from reliable sources, which means that we don’t see eye to eye on many issues.
So we need the negotiations. Need to go back to some confidence-building measures, first of all, soft issues that need to be addressed. You know what? Why should the border and the passages between the two countries be closed? For example, why should Chaman be closed? Why should Torkham be closed? At this moment, everybody’s getting hurt.
I saw somebody the other day in the Pakistani parliament, showing a tomato and saying, Look, we can’t afford tomatoes because we cannot import tomatoes from Afghanistan. So everybody is suffering as a result of this. And then you have 1000s and 1000s of people who want to go to Pakistan for treatment, health treatment, but they cannot do so.
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You have transit and trade that have stopped at the border, at the ports; you have access to Central Asia that has stopped. So all of this is hurting the economy, is hurting people. And I think that we need to address these issues as confidence-building measures first and foremost, and then slowly get into the nitty-gritty of the security issues with proof and with evidence, and then with a mechanism.
Dr. Pirzada: You have a vantage point, because you have also served in the last 20 years with the Ashraf Ghani government and the Afghan government when the US forces were there. The situation has, in a very ironic way, turned around, in the sense that then the US forces, you know, Ambassador Zalmay Khalidzad, you know, the other people, they were basically saying that the Afghan Taliban were operating from bases within Peshawar and quota and and Pakistan needs to do more about it, you know.
Now, Pakistan is actually saying the Afghan Taliban, the TTP, is operating from Kabul in different places. And you need to do more about it, you know. So, was there any satisfactory solution? Was Pakistan able to find a solution to the Afghan allegations?
Ambassador Samad: Not really. No. There were bandage solutions, not long-term, durable solutions. And that’s why the wound festers again and we see it re-emerge. So what we need to do is have a serious discussion. Mediation is very good. I think that it’s needed by parties that are credible, and both of these countries have shown themselves to be good mediators, and we appreciate that very much.
I think that it’s the leadership on both sides that really needs to be a bit more flexible. Take a step away from the kinetics, engage in confidence-building measures and discussions on soft issues, and take measures that do not hurt our populations, our economies, and then we can address the other issues. Now, I’m not saying that this is the time to talk about the Durand Line.
I’m saying that maybe the Durand line is an issue that has a totally different approach to it. First and foremost, Afghans need to have a discussion inside their own country about it as well. Maybe Pakistanis, or maybe people in the tribal regions, have to have a discussion as well. Maybe jirgas between the two countries can address some of the issues. You know, it’s the jirgas that we have on our side, and jirgas you have on your tribal region side. They have, at times, been effective and successful in de-escalating tension. So we need to use these types of mechanisms as appropriate and as needed, but it needs an outside-the-box thinking Moeed.
I think that we have, or we used to use the same tactics. And what I’m afraid of is that this may escalate into something that we do not want.
Dr. Pirzada: Escalate into what?
Ambassador Samad: I think into an opportunity for a proxy war to take place.
Dr. Pirzada: But if you look at from the kind of the kind of rhetoric that is emerging from Pindi and Islamabad, they see themselves as a nuclear power. They’re saying that we don’t have any intentions on Afghan soil. It’s a different thing. We are not invaders. We’re not going to conquer Afghanistan, but we’re going to punish them, I mean, through the Air Force and through the drone strikes.
And Afghan government doesn’t have an Air Force or drones. And even when the US was there and Pakistan had given permission, my understanding was that and United States conducted more than 300, if not more, drone strikes into Pakistan, against the TTP hideouts in the Afghan Taliban. I think they also killed the Afghan Taliban leader. So Pakistan can continue to do the same inside Afghanistan, right? They’re saying we are only
Ambassador Samad: But that runs counter to international law. Runs counter to humanitarian law when you kill civilians, and only in the past two, three weeks, we’ve had hundreds of civilians killed on both sides, including civilians in the city of Kabul, something that Afghans will not forget. They cannot forget the fact that after 1919, when the British bombed Kabul during the third Anglo-Afghan war, this was the first time, except drones that are being used occasionally, this was the first time that a non-Afghan entity was using airplanes on the city of Kabul. Not even the Soviets and the Americans used it.
Dr. Pirzada: The Soviets never used it?
Ambassador Samad: Not in the city of Kabul. Planes have been used to run over and during a coup, maybe by an Afghan pilot, and a drone was used to target a terrorist.
Dr. Pirzada: Are you saying that in 20 years of conflict, the United States has never used the Air Force inside Kabul to bomb the city of Kabul?
Ambassador Samad: No!
Dr. Pirzada: And the Soviets?
Ambassador Samad: The Soviets neither.
Dr. Pirzada: What about the Soviet gunship helicopters and everything?
Ambassador Samad: They were all outside of Kabul. So what I’m saying is the symbol symbolism, it’s like Afghans sending an airplane to bomb Islamabad.
Dr.Pirzada: Afghans don’t have this. I mean, if Afghans had that kind of balance of power, then perhaps Pakistan would be a little conscious of that. You know, did the problem?
Ambassador Samad: I hope we don’t reach that point where we are trying to solve this problem by escalating and by becoming more militaristic. I think that what we need to do is de-escalate and use less of the military. I think Afghans have other means if they wanted to defend themselves, if they had to do something to hurt somebody else, Afghans have other means to do it.
Every country has the means to use other methods to hurt someone in your capital or in this city or that city, or my city. So we don’t want to, we don’t want to take that route. I think we should avoid taking
Dr. Pirzada: Ambassador, I also do a Urdu vlog. I have maintained this continuous position on my social media and on my videos that Pakistan should not strike, whatever the reason is, Pakistan should not use the Air Force and drones inside Afghanistan. This is my stated position. However, I’m just putting forward the way the Pakistani authorities are looking at it. They see we have a powerful air force. They see we have drones.
Ambassador Samad: Moeed, the Soviet Union had 100 times more equipment and armament in planes than Pakistan, and it is a superpower and a nuclear power. It was a superpower. It’s a nuclear power. The United States used the ‘mother of all bombs’ in Afghanistan, and the United States dropped many bombs to counter the opposition groups. It is a nuclear superpower in a nuclear power, but both of them, after a few years, left. So even though this is not an issue of invading or occupying a country, we are neighbors.
We have 2500 and something kilometers of border, 2600 kilometers. So we need to live next to each other. We need to find common ground. We need to be able to interact, and we need to be able to trade, and we need to de-escalate all of these tensions. Both sides are responsible. I’m not one of those who put all the blame and all the responsibility on one side or the other. Both sides are responsible. They have their own responsibility. But we need to deal with reality and facts, and evidence.
We cannot become a proxy for somebody else. We cannot allow others to turn either one of these countries into proxy battlefields. I think that is one of the lessons that we as Afghans have learned over the last 50 years of our existence.
Dr. Pirzada: Ambassador, you know, looking at the position of the spokespersons and so many apologists for the Pakistani regime, I have come to understand that they believe this thing, that whereas the Soviet Union and the United States were running a government, they had the cities and the structure. They were responsible for the governance and the Afghans. In both instances, the Mujahideen and subsequently the Afghan Taliban could afford a guerrilla fight.
In the case of Pakistan, they are not going to run Afghanistan. Anything that they have discussed, what they have actually found out, a formula, or they have created a formula under the Pakistan army chief, is that anything that happens in Pakistan, they are going to attack a site in Afghanistan. So this is a totally new kind of situation.
The Americans were not doing it. The Soviets were not doing it. The Soviets never attacked inside Pakistan; apart from power projection, the Americans were making the drone strikes with the permission of the Pakistani side. The Pakistani military has created a new formula. So what you’re actually saying refers back to the last 50 years. They’re saying, anything happens in Peshawar, anything happens in FATA.
Ambassador Samad: If the Pakistani military has found a new formula, the same way that Afghans found a new formula against the Soviets and others who came to Afghanistan, or anyone who has been a threat to Afghanistan, whether domestic or otherwise, they will find a new formula. So this is the unfortunately, this is the logic of war. And yes, Pakistan is much more powerful, has a bigger army, much more professional than what we have. We are still rack tagged, you know, we still, we are an isolated, non-recognized, the Taliban are in Afghanistan is in a very precarious way,
Dr. Pirzada: But you are not part of the Afghan Taliban.
Ambassador Samad: I’m talking about the national interest, the National, you know, the Afghans overall, generally, when it comes to, you know, this is not a question of dividing the Afghans. Some people try to do that. But when our territory is under threat, when our innocent people are being killed, when sovereignty is under assault, then obviously it’s not a question of whether you’re Taliban or a communist or a Democrat. It’s a question of what position you take vis-à-vis your country.
Dr. Pirzada: If I correctly understand that these Pakistani attacks on Kabul and Afghanistan are sort of uniting the Afghan people, irrespective of the fact whether they’re pro Taliban or not.
Ambassador Samad: I think, except for some circles and some segments of society who may either not feel, you know, loyal to anything, and maybe even to a single unitary state. There are some Afghans now who don’t believe in a unitary state, who overwhelmingly majority of Afghans will obviously feel offended when their capital city is attacked, who wouldn’t?
Dr. Pirzada: Interesting. So, how do you look at this one-week-long visit of the Afghan foreign minister to Delhi and the very warm embrace by Delhi, India’s decision to upgrade its technical office to the level of an embassy? So, do you think that India will stay isolated from the Pakistan-Afghanistan conflict will it actually be sucked in on the side of the Afghan Taliban?
Ambassador Samad: Well, you know, every country in the region has expressed itself, including India. India’s last statement on the conflict was a bit more severe and a bit more direct, in terms of its relationship with Pakistan, of course, and the fact that India thinks that Pakistan is using terrorist proxies or terrorist groups against Indian interests. So the whole Kashmir issue between India and Pakistan, yes, Afghanistan has, at times, been, I don’t know if I would use the word victim, but as I’ve been affected by the Kashmir issue and by tensions between India and Pakistan.
Dr. Pirzada: How is Afghanistan affected by the Kashmir issue?
Ambassador Samad: Well, I mean, if you are thinking that India is your enemy, and that India and Afghanistan have warm relations, and you cannot tolerate normal relations between India and Pakistan, and you’re in your cutting the flow of trade between India and Afghanistan to your territory, that obviously means that you are trying to control the foreign policy of two other countries, at least one of them. And if Pakistan thinks that it can control the foreign policy of Afghanistan like the British did before independence, I think that it’s a losing game. I think that there are better ways of addressing the issues, instead of trying to say that I’m going to determine what kind of relationship you should have with India or China or Russia or Iran or anybody in Afghanistan.
You know, again, at the end of the day, is a sovereign state, and it has its own rights, even though it has issues right now with the international community and the Taliban have issues with both Afghan people and international community that but at the end of the day, you know, the same thing applies to Pakistan as it applies to Afghanistan.
Dr. Pirzada: Is there any progress? You are based in Washington. You’re working with the Atlantic Council. Is there any progress with the United States and the Western world recognizing the Afghan Taliban the way Russia, China, and India?
Ambassador Samad: Of course, only Russia has recognized formally, but Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan, India, they all have their embassies in Kabul. Is there in any way? So what we see is a trend, and some are more advanced in their engagement with the Taliban than others. The West, and especially the United States, is not as advanced. There’s a lot of reluctance, there’s a lot of angst, there’s a lot of bad memories from Afghanistan. Some are emotional about it still. But you know, it depends on what the new leadership in the United States is thinking. You know, the fact that they hosted Pakistan’s leaders two or three times in the White House and CENTCOM, and other places, says that at least military-to-military, there is some warmth, a transactional relationship somewhere. Now the question is, is Afghanistan part of this equation or not? And if it is, in what way, for what purpose? And with what goal in mind?, but we are too. We are. We’re at a distance from this. I think that the Americans are most. Watching, observing, Mr. Trump, as you know, two or three times in the past few days, has offered to step in.
Dr. Pirzada: And exactly, I wanted to ask you, I mean, what do you make of it? Did Trump’s offer to
Ambassador Samad: Well, it’s Mr. Trump, you know, it’s I think it’s part of his mindset, that he feels that he has resolved many issues around the world, and that anything else that pops up, like Afghanistan, Pakistan, tensions, if there’s a need for him to step in, he would do so. Now, is he saying it as part of a strategy, or is he saying it as part of a Trump reaction, as we have seen in other cases? Is it part of a program, or is it a standalone issue? It’s not clear yet. We will see, you know, in the next, in the future, we will see,
Dr. Pirzada: What do you make of the Trump What do you make of the Trump statements on Bagram base that, I mean, he has, he’s in talks with, I mean, he walks back from Air Base. Do you see any other, any other, any other player within the United States?
Ambassador Samad: Yeah, the Bagram issue started first during the campaign against Mr. Biden. So it was used as a campaign rhetoric and a campaign sort of weapon against Mr. Biden. Once, Mr. Trump won. On a few occasions, he’s mentioned Bagram, and at one point, he said that we are discussing this, and if it doesn’t happen, there’s going to be some bad things that are going to happen. So it’s the it’s on the back of his in the back of his mind, because he remembers it from 2019-20, when it was being discussed in Doha between the Americans and the Taliban at the time, who were looking at Bagram as a possibility for some kind of a counterterrorism cooperation hub, a multinational one, maybe involving some Intelligence Services who would be looking at what’s happening to fight terrorism. And maybe Mr. Trump thinks that he would like to have access to that kind of venue.
Dr. Pirzada: What if Pakistan, Afghanistan again enter into a week or 10 days long war and airstrikes, and then Trump jumps in, steps in, settles and, I mean, gives peace, and in return, he expects the Afghan Taliban to give him the Bagram Air Base. What about
Ambassador Samad: He’s going to have to convince the Taliban and whoever else that they need to sit down and have a talk. If it’s going to be the use of force, if it’s going to be, again, kinetics, if it’s going to be, he’s not using kinetics. Pakistan is using kinetics. So, as I said, or use somebody else to use kinetics, then we are back to the same situation. There are better ways. You know, in everything, you have bad and good, better and worse. In politics as well as geopolitics, you have choices. And I think that we have to look at the choices very carefully and see if there’s a better choice to discuss an issue, whether it’s counterterrorism, whether it’s some kind of cooperation, whether it’s, you know, opening an embassy, we need to look at the options and we need to decide collectively together on what’s best to come to a win, win solution instead of a lose lose
Dr. Pirzada: Ambassador, apart from, apart from the Bagram Air Base. You are in DC. You have worked in this city and this culture for so long. I mean, you’ve been educated in the US. You have contacts, connectivity. Do you see there’s any palpable desire in the Washington power centers to destabilize Afghanistan once again, for any kind of strategic reasons?
Ambassador Samad: There are some circles that would like they are upset that the military option four years ago ended. They would have liked to see the military option continue to be part of a military presence. What does it mean? The presence of US forces, even if small, or some type of military involvement in Afghanistan. And I think that the actual program, and we’re getting into something, you know, different, a very complex issue of what the negotiations were all about and what came out of it, and what was supposed to come of it.
I think that Mr. Trump thinks that we should have had a different scenario emerge four years ago, and since it didn’t, I’m going to blame Biden for it, and I’m also going to. See if I can rectify it. But the situation has changed, so my rectification, or my solution, is not going to look the same way as it did before. So it’s a new solution.
Dr. Pirzada: So, since Trump had authorized and kick-started the Doha process, what was the kind of outcome President Trump, if he had not lost the presidency, was expecting out of the process?
Ambassador Samad: Very good question. Moeed! I think that what you would have seen is an end to the American military presence in Afghanistan, a departure without chaos, a better-managed withdrawal, and any transfer of power to a coalition government made up of Taliban and others, minus the Ashraf Ghani clique; the others would have been anyone else who was part of the Afghan political scenery. I think Pakistan was also very much on board with this later on. They may have changed their mind when the Taliban were left as the only player in Kabul, because that process was sabotaged, and that process basically did not materialize, because on one hand, the president of the country fled at the last moment, creating a vacuum. In the vacuum, your previous boss, well, somebody needs to go and ask some of these questions.
Dr. Pirzada: Have you spoken with him ever?
Ambassador Samad: No, I have not. I have not. No, I actually resigned. I was appointed as ambassador to go to Brussels and was in charge of the EU and NATO, all of that, but I did not. I even, even though my agreement came, but I resigned in protest because I did not believe that the solution was more war. I believe that we needed to, while we had leverage, we needed to use the leverage smartly and make sure that we have a political settlement. And I believe that a political settlement would have been better for Afghanistan than one side losing completely and the other side winning completely.
Dr. Pirzada: So, why do you think I mean this is a very interesting point that actually came towards the very much end when we wanted to wind up the discussion that Trump had a different outcome in mind. He was expecting the transfer of power to a coalition of Afghan elements that include the Afghan Taliban, plus other elements, maybe the Northern Alliance, and you know, Hamid Karzai, and you said, the Pakistanis are also on board. They also didn’t want the Afghan Taliban to capture the whole power. So, how come a totally different outcome when Pakistanis were on board with the Americans, how did a totally different outcome actually materialize?
Ambassador Samad: The vacuum left one element in charge. There was no other option; they actually offered the Americans to come back and secure the Kabul American, the Taliban. They have said it. It’s on the record. American diplomats have said it as well. On the last day, they offered the Americans to return to Kabul as they were leaving, but they had not left fully. They were on the verge of leaving on that chaotic day, and they asked the Americans to come back and secure Kabul, because they were thinking that if we entered the city, we would clash with the government forces, and it would be a bloodbath. And they wanted to avoid that. So they’ve said, Come and secure it, and then we’ll continue the negotiations. And that never happened, because the Americans said, We are not, we don’t have orders to come back. We have orders to leave the country. So we are not prepared to come back and and the only option left was for the Taliban to step in.
Dr. Pirzada: I’m reminded of a briefing which Pakistan’s then DG isI general far Sami and Pakistan’s Army chief, General Bajwa, did for about 40 plus journalists in ISI headquarters, either in June of 2021 or in the beginning of the July 2021 in which they gave their assessment that the Afghan government in Kabul has more than 300,000 troops, 350,000 troops. And their estimate was this, that even after the gradual withdrawal of the US forces, there would be a war going on for the next one year or so, and the Afghan and Taliban would not be able to occupy Kabul so quickly. However, within the same briefing, there were Pashtun journalists of Pakistan, and they said that the Pakistani Army is deliberately creating misinformation because the Afghan National Army is in no mood to fight, and they will vacate the cities, and they will run away. These were the ethnic people.
Ambassador Samad: Nobody could have predicted that. I mean, nobody predicted the disintegration of the Afghan forces. Then, just a period of a few days and no more than three weeks, and in Kabul as the last bastion and the most important Bastion, nobody thought that there would be no resistance whatsoever, and that the forces would totally disintegrate and that there would be no clashes, no fighting, and that a city of 6 billion would fall into Taliban hands. Even the Taliban themselves did not think that would happen. It was not part of their strategic thinking. Maybe some of them hoped that it would happen, but it was not part of their planning.
Dr. Pirzada: This is totally something new. But having said this, what you have said, Then, could it be this that in the Trump’s mind and some of the top decision makers in CENTCOM, they think that we need to use Pakistan to force Afghan Taliban into a different kind of political outcome in which there can be a power sharing agreement, there can be a decision about the background air base. We can bring the opposition and the coalition into Kabul. I mean, could it be a possibility? I mean, do you smell something like this?
Ambassador Samad: It was definitely a possibility back then, and they were all working towards it. And it wasn’t just the other countries around us were more or less going along with it as well. So there was a bit of a consensus on this, but that consensus is broken. We are not in 2021 anymore. We’re in 2025, soon to go into 2026, the environment is different. The ecosystem is different. The players have different interests. The division between east and west and north and south is more acute.
Alignments are not the same, and I think that geopolitics and geostrategy have shifted. So I am not sure. I’m not saying that it’s not possible. I’m not saying, but it has to be part again. It cannot be part of another major military operation or occupation or invasion or anything, whether through proxies or direct, because that would be, I think, counterproductive. Maybe some people prefer that.
Dr. Pirzada: European countries have not recognized the Afghan Taliban government, and the United Nations has not recognized them. Pakistan picks up a kinetic conflict Afghan Taliban have no solution for the TTP. Pakistan keeps on doing kinetic actions against the Afghan Taliban. And could this not force the Afghan Taliban for a different political solution?
Ambassador Samad: The Afghan Taliban would have to think hard about what is best for them and for what’s best for the country. I hope they think about the country first. But the Afghan Taliban also have been around for more than 30 years, and they are hard-headed, as we know. They can be difficult to deal with, and they are very, at times, very astute negotiators. So if we take the path of negotiations and talks, who knows, maybe there’s a chance for some type of formula. But if we take the path of war and destruction and mayhem again, I’m not sure that there’s going to be a good outcome for the Afghans, especially, but also for others in this very volatile region of the world.
Dr. Pirzada: My last set of questions, I know that you have an early morning session. We have just we have touched upon some subjects. What if the Afghan Taliban are not able to find a credible solution for the TTP? What if the TTP is not the actual problem? Can the Afghan Taliban just get rid of the TTP to find peace with Pakistan? Are you expecting something like that to happen in the next several days and weeks?
Ambassador Samad: I think that there has to be, I believe, always in flexibility. I believe in give and take and negotiations. I believe in taking a step towards in reciprocity, seeing a step being taken. I think that if you have that kind of an approach, and you understand what’s at stake, then you can find ways to sort of come up with a solution that all sides can agree to. And it may not be the perfect solution. See if we are aiming for zero-sum outcomes. If Pakistan says, Get rid of the Taliban. I don’t know if the Afghan Taliban can deliver and do that.
Dr. Pirzada: Expel the TTP leadership from Afghanistan. Also, are you smelling this is not the real reason?
Ambassador Samad: I mean, I think. Have done whatever is possible to either expel or prevent them from staging anything from Afghanistan, or even, I’ve heard that they have taken them into more remote areas of Afghanistan away from the Durand line. So we have, we have solutions to a problem that doesn’t need a hammer. So we can, we can maybe take that route, but we need to not be, you know, requesting and demanding and expecting things that cannot be delivered, because then that raises the question of what else is happening. Why are you asking for something that I cannot, I cannot deliver?
Dr. Pirzada: I’m actually saying the same thing. Maybe the TTP is not the real issue. Maybe there is a geostrategic right.
Ambassador Samad: So obviously the Taliban are thinking along those lines as well, as they think that there may be something else, and they need guarantees and assurances as well. Both sides need some breathing space. And how do you create the breathing space is by de-escalating, by showing an intent to discuss things and looking at it from a technical perspective, if possible, and using mediation as well. All of these things have been tried, but should continue to be tried as well, because the other options, again, are pretty bleak for everyone. Even though Pakistan may feel that it’s much more powerful and it can control the situation.
Dr. Pirzada: I have a very interesting Brainwave. So Russia is the only country that has actually recognized the Afghan Taliban government. Do you think this provides Russia an opportunity to actually come and be a player in the region?
Ambassador Samad: Once again, the Russia complications that I’m alluding to, and I’m not spelling it out, are the regional dimension. So when it spirals out of control. And when it involves more than one entity, it can, you know, it can become something bigger, and so, so this is what I’m saying, is to avoid this issue becoming something bigger that would be detrimental to some, to many, maybe, but could benefit one or two at the end of the day. We are not sure. But how would it change the calculus? In the strategic calculus, there is a question that I don’t have an answer for.
Dr. Pirzada: Ambassador Omar Samad. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Samad: Thank you, Moeed. I appreciate it. I enjoyed it!