In August 2024 it was Bangladesh. In September 2025 it was Nepal. Young, angry men took to the streets, burning and looting public and private property without fear of police or bullets. In Bangladesh more than 400 people died before Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a close ally of India, realised her handpicked army chief would not defend her and she fled to New Delhi. In Nepal the pro-China prime minister Sharma Oli resigned within 48 hours of riots that left 19 dead after the army chief, General Ashok Raj Sigdel, reportedly asked him to step down. On the surface the script looked like a photocopy of Bangladesh, but with one decisive difference: in Dhaka India lost influence while in Kathmandu China lost ground to India.
Most people in Pakistan are less interested in those fine distinctions. They ask a simpler, sharper question. Why has a similar rupture not happened in Pakistan, where a brutal regime backed by the military rules 250 million people with growing use of coercion? Why do Pakistanis appear to tolerate recurrent political abuse? Why do mass protests repeatedly fizzle without producing lasting change?
Moeed Pirzada, editor of GVS, brings together Dr Hussain Nadim of George Washington University and Erik Sperling, founder and executive director of Just Foreign Policy, to grapple with those questions and to ask what the region’s recent upheavals mean for Pakistan.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: We are going to start by looking at a very interesting development in South Asia, where the Nepalese government of Prime Minister Sharma Oli has suddenly fallen within the last 48 hours to what has been described as Generation Z protests. Though there are many interesting undertones to this development, I will start by asking both of my participants. Erik, let me begin with you—how are you looking at this change in Nepal?
Erik Sperling: I think in some ways it is inspiring, but also troubling because of the violence, which even the protest organizers were trying to control. At the same time, it has significant geopolitical implications, with Nepal caught between being closer to China or closer to India. On one hand, it’s encouraging for those who want to see change, but it also shows that other factors are at play, especially in a region where India, China, and the United States all have strong interests.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So Erik, if I put a counter question—do you think this was purely a protest by Generation Z, or was there something else happening? On Monday, in an unusual move, the embassies of the United States, UK, France, Japan, and several other Western countries came out strongly in favor of the protesters, saying their rights must be respected. Do you think there is an international dimension here, or was what happened in Nepal simply an internal, organic change?
Erik Sperling: In virtually every protest movement, there are genuine grievances and sentiments. Those cannot be manufactured. But those of us who study these issues notice how quickly Western powers respond and the tone they use. All three of us here have probably spent a lot of time analyzing such statements. I’ve seen it across different regions as well. The fact that Western embassies reacted so strongly does signal something.
We’ve seen in Pakistan that even incredible protest movements received very little attention internationally. So in Nepal, the reaction may suggest something about the government’s alignment with China, which was unusual. And when I looked at this protest movement, it struck me as impressively organized. If you look at their Twitter page, it’s very polished. That could be the work of gifted organizers, but it could also suggest outside support.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: I like the term “gifted set of organizers.” What do you exactly mean by that?
Erik Sperling: I mean people who inspire their followers and communicate effectively with them. That’s something every pro-democracy or accountability movement values. But sometimes protest movements are so effective that they seem far more capable than everyone else in the political space. This can happen when lessons from other global movements are imported—sometimes organically, sometimes with outside involvement.
In this case, it’s clear that India, China, and the West all have interests in Nepal. Nobody would deny that. What we cannot say with certainty is to what extent they shaped this movement. But it is worth noting: how quickly the West responded, how organized the protests were, how successful they became almost immediately, and how much sharper and more effective they appeared compared to the government they were challenging. It gives the impression that the protesters are from another era—tech-savvy, sharp, and effective—while the state seems outdated. That contrast really stood out to me.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Let me bring Hussain into it. Dr Hussain, how are you looking at the situation in Nepal?
Dr Hussain Nadim: I think it follows much of what Erik has said. I echo that. But there are other elements I want to discuss as well. This is a new manifestation of an emerging trend that has been building for years, not just recently. I’ll break it down into three Ds, and I want to share some data because that will illuminate a lot of what is happening.
The first D is demography. If you look at the median age in Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and even Pakistan, much of the crisis comes from the fact that the majority population is under 30. In Pakistan, 67% of the population is under 30; in Sri Lanka it’s about 62%; in Bangladesh around 60%; and in Nepal between 55% and 58%. That’s a massive youth bulge.
The second D is digitalization. In the past 15 years, the digital integration, adaptability, and decentralized social media networks have empowered this young demographic. Power over narratives and centralized authority has been diluted, devolving down to the masses, especially the younger population.
The third D I like to call dinosaurs, but more accurately it is democracy. Since 2008, Nepal has had about 14 government changes, and none completed its tenure. This reflects a weak state of democracy across South Asia. If you look at Sri Lanka, Pakistan, or Nepal, the pattern is the same. The only difference is India, where cycles of change have completed and governments have served full terms, which has allowed India to grow.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hasina Wajid was sitting in Bangladesh for 15 long years, from 2009 to 2024.
Dr Hussain Nadim: Exactly. That shows how democracy was trampled by a prolonged rule in a dictatorial style. So across South Asia, very clear patterns are emerging. The youth bulge, digitalization, and weak democratic structures have created a wedge between old and new power centers. That’s the core of the issue.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But Hussain, you mentioned Bangladesh and Hasina. In Bangladesh, when Hasina was kicked out and ran to India, it looked like India was forced out as the dominant power there. In Nepal, it seems China has been kicked out, and India emerges victorious. How do you see this equation?
Dr Hussain Nadim: Foreign powers always have interests. They even contest over empty islands in the South China Sea. So naturally, countries that are strategically located—Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan—become spaces for contestation. But the variations differ. These countries may not represent core strategic interests, but when there are genuine grievances in the population, the question for foreign policymakers—like in the US State Department or the White House—is whether to ride that tide or oppose it.
For example, in Pakistan they chose to oppose the tide, which required enormous resources, willpower, and manufacturing of consent within Washington. In other countries, where stakes are lower, foreign powers often ride the tide rather than fight it. So I would say 20–30% of these movements are shaped by external interests, but the majority remain domestic and locally driven.
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Dr Moeed Pirzada: It’s interesting, Erik, you mentioned protesters looking very organized. When change came in Bangladesh, there was a lot of uproar in Pakistan—people asked why such change was not happening here, where tyranny is worse. Bangladesh had tyranny, yes. Nepal did not experience the same level of abuse as Pakistan, yet change still came. In Pakistan, attempts at protests are crushed. From your perspective in Washington, what is the difference between Bangladesh, Nepal, and Pakistan?
Erik Sperling: I don’t claim to be an expert on domestic dynamics the way both of you are, but from a U.S. perspective, one thing really stood out. I followed what I thought was an incredibly impressive protest movement in Pakistan—caravans removing blockades, making their way to protest sites. It was almost made-for-TV.
Over 20–25 years, I’ve seen many protest movements covered heavily in U.S. media. People like my mother, while cooking dinner, would learn about them on TV. But in Pakistan’s case, this didn’t happen—even though we’re not talking about an unknown figure. Imran Khan is one of the most famous athletes in the world, a star, and a likable person regardless of political disagreements.
Yet somehow, the protests around him didn’t register internationally. To me, that was the biggest challenge: the lack of narrative. Protest organizers could have done more to push that narrative out, but the regime was much more effective at controlling it. Once a narrative is created, it gains momentum in Western capitals, governments start commenting, protests gain energy, and eventually regimes are forced to decide whether to concede or crack down under global scrutiny. That narrative gap was the key missing factor.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: One interesting contrast is that in November 2024, around 100,000 people entered Islamabad from the north and west. Yet this massive protest barely got international coverage. Only BBC Urdu and one or two others reported it. Meanwhile, in Nepal, as soon as unrest began, international media covered it extensively, reporting even the police firing on protesters. Western embassies also reacted immediately. Why is there such a big difference?
Erik Sperling: This has been studied by many people. It comes down to the absence of an “expert class.” In Pakistan’s case, there are maybe only two or three recognized experts in the U.S., and most focus on counterterrorism, not democracy. So when no one is telling reporters, “Hey, you’re missing a big story here,” the media doesn’t cover it.
This self-reinforces. If no one highlights the story, the media overlooks it. And, of course, there’s interplay with interests. When an issue isn’t tied to major lobbies in Washington, there’s less expert focus. Defense think tanks, for instance, get involved when they see potential gains—say, if a regime change means shifting from Chinese to U.S. military hardware. That funding then drives media attention.
So it’s a systemic issue, much like what Noam Chomsky described in Manufacturing Consent: media narratives in the West are indirectly shaped by institutional and financial interests. That largely explains the difference.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hussain, many in Pakistan, as I mentioned earlier, feel that such change cannot come here. What do you think is the difference between Nepal, Bangladesh, and Pakistan?
Dr Hussain Nadim: Okay, so I’m going to try and break this down, because it’s been a very interesting debate on social media. A lot of blame goes to the public—that they are not courageous enough, that they are cowards for not coming out. People say, “Look at what’s happening in Bangladesh and Nepal.” But really, that reflects a lack of understanding. There is nothing shameful for the public, who have come out repeatedly. The youth in Pakistan has come out. I think the real shame lies with the elite in Pakistan—the ruling elite—who have infested themselves so deeply into the system. The monsters that the people of Pakistan face are ten times bigger than the small-time masters in Bangladesh and elsewhere. Let me explain why.
First, and this may be a little controversial, Pakistan is not a fully developed nation. Nations are built over time, and Pakistan is still in that process. What we have is a very specific elite that has entrenched itself in deep elite capture. They borrowed and perfected the British Empire’s policies of divide and rule and implemented them as a governance model in the so-called postcolonial state. This has meant practicing divide and rule across ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines. By doing this, they’ve created artificial chaos—layers upon layers of chaos—for the past 75 years.
The reason is clear: by dividing Punjab from Pashtuns, political party A from political party B, and then rejoining them in convenient coalitions, the state replicated what the British perfected in India. People now shame Pakistanis for not rising up, but ask yourself—who rose up against the British across India? Very few. Most of the people were actually cooperating with the British administration.
After independence, Pakistan’s military stepped into the shoes of the crown. The army assumed the role of political arbiter above politics. Their self-image is that they are beyond politics, and so they intervene whenever the public rises against one party or another. Each time, they reset the order to preserve the status quo. That is the key difference: in Pakistan, the army acts as political arbiter. This role does not exist in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Nepal. Their militaries may maintain order, but they do not play this overarching political role.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So basically, what you’re saying, Hussain—and I’ll bring Erik into this—is that in Pakistan, when the public comes out, they are actually facing the army. The Pakistani government—whether it’s Sharif or Zardari—is merely a façade, an optic. In reality, it is the military that runs the show. In Bangladesh and Nepal, it was not the military. The military there was an organ of the state, but it did not step in to rescue the government. In Bangladesh, the military decided not to bail out Sheikh Hasina, even when junior officers voiced discontent. The military stayed away from the fray; it was Hasina with the police.
The same happened in Nepal. The military only came in to impose curfew once Prime Minister Oli had already offered his resignation. They didn’t defend parliament or ministers’ homes. Ministers were beaten on the road. The finance minister was beaten on the road. The prime minister’s house was burned. Many ministers’ homes were burned. But the military remained neutral. In Pakistan, by contrast, it is the people versus the military.
Dr Hussain Nadim: That’s true. But let me add one qualifying point. For the past 75 years, the military integrated itself into politics with public tolerance, because people believed the army was a counterbalance to the feudal class, the political class, and the bureaucracy. Every time a military dictator took over, the public welcomed it, because Bhuttos and Sharifs were seen as creating havoc in daily life. The military appeared to provide balance—though in reality, it was orchestrating everything from behind the curtain.
This illusion collapsed when the army clashed with Imran Khan. The military expected the same reaction—that people would be grateful. But that didn’t happen. A new dynamic has entered the script, and the army doesn’t know how to handle it.
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When we talk about Pakistan, we must also talk about the three A’s. The first is the Army, which is counter-revolutionary and can fizzle out any uprising. The second is America. The U.S. has always played a stabilizing role for the status quo. Each time the people rose up, it was IMF injections and U.S. endorsement that gave breathing room to dictators—be it Ayub Khan, Zia, or Musharraf. Relations between Pakistan and the U.S. have historically been most stable under military rule, precisely because Washington preferred it. That external support makes revolutions difficult to sustain, as international injections prevent state collapse.
The third element is Allah—religiosity. Religion has served as an opiate, persuading people to endure hardships and leaving them reluctant to challenge the order. Most Pakistanis under 30—and even older, those with families—don’t want bloody revolutions. They expect political parties, representatives, or even the military to protect their interests.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: They want to see the revolution on their television screens or their Twitter feeds, but not participate directly.
Dr Hussain Nadim: Exactly. You can’t expect ordinary people with jobs and families to come out when those entrusted with power should be representing their interests.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Let me bring Erik in for some summing up. Alexis, we can see two main points stand out. One: when the youth in Pakistan protests, they confront the army itself—the state. In Bangladesh and Nepal, that was not the case. Two: the external stakeholders. In Pakistan, the West—particularly the U.S.—is aligned with the military. In Nepal, the external factor was India, which has historically been deeply embedded through economic, commercial, religious, educational, and military ties. China tried to make inroads through Prime Minister Oli, but ultimately India prevailed and China was pushed out. So, three factors emerge: first, the Nepalese state was not a military state; second, an external actor—India—supported the protesters; and third, the Pakistani case is entirely different. Erik, what do you think?
Erik Sperling: Those are fascinating points. I love listening to the professor’s analysis. The difference is stark. In Pakistan, the military is incredibly well funded, with decades of experience. And it shows in how they manage crowds.
In the Pakistan protests you mentioned—the marches and demonstrations—the military managed them in a way that avoided the kind of explosive moments Nepal saw. In Nepal, violent responses spurred protesters on, galvanized media coverage, and escalated events rapidly. In Pakistan, the military represses more strategically. They wait for the right moment, cut the lights, remove cameras, and then disperse people. They even reach hospitals to control what gets reported. It’s a well-oiled machine.
There are few regimes so skilled at managing protests while being so poor at basic governance and economics. The Pakistani military excels at crowd control and repression, preventing the kinds of flashpoints that could trigger revolutions.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hussain, what Eric is referring to—I think after the mass movements of 1969, 1971, and 1977—the Pakistani civil-military bureaucracy developed a specialization and skill set in not letting large crowds form. They attack while the crowds are still developing, preventing even a few thousand people from assembling. PTI managed a miracle by bringing thousands from KP, but that was because they governed there. In Punjab, the civil-military bureaucracy never allows people to gather at one point. They start attacking when there are just 40 or 50 people. This is what Eric is pointing to: Pakistan’s coercive apparatus is very well developed. It consistently fails in governance, economics, and direction, but excels in subjugating people.
Dr Hussain Nadim: I want to trace why that is the case. It’s easy to commend Pakistan for controlling protests and avoiding revolutions, but if we push back 50 years, Pakistan is the only South Asian country that actually fragmented—Bangladesh seceded after Mujibur Rahman’s movement. The military establishment learned lessons from that episode, but not the best ones. Even today, Pakistan is far from fully controlling chaos. Large parts of Balochistan are outside state writ. In the borderlands of Balochistan and KP, smuggling thrives, and the TTP continues to fight the state. The state is in constant survival mode.
So I’m not sure they are truly controlling things well. Control, properly defined, means smooth governance. In Pakistan, it’s done brutishly. After the 1970s, two things changed: first, Pakistan entrenched itself in the geopolitical space, using its relevance as leverage. Second, it developed the “N-card”—the nuclear card. Unlike Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, or Nepal, Pakistan is a nuclear power. That makes foreign states treat it differently. They see Pakistan as geopolitically vital, with the added problems of extremism and nuclear weapons. This allows the ruling elite to perpetuate its survival—nobody wants to intervene directly in a nuclear mess.
The third factor is how Pakistan’s ruling elite has self-sabotaged. Like sipping poison daily to build immunity, they’ve created artificial chaos: Balochistan, the TTP, the TLP. This constant turmoil produces resilience within state and society, keeping everyone in survival mode.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So, summing up—you’re saying the ruling elite, civil and military, have deliberately created subnational crises in Balochistan, KP, and elsewhere to keep their power base in Punjab and Sindh fearful about the state’s survival. They constantly invoke threats: conflict with India, insurgency in Balochistan, danger from Afghanistan, unrest in FATA. This keeps the population anxious about the state’s collapse.
Dr Hussain Nadim: Exactly. This is “rule by chaos.” When faced with chaos, they don’t solve it—they create new layers of it. That’s been the story of the last 50 years. Before 1971, Pakistan was building strategic plans, five-year programs, big dams. Since then, it’s been moving from crisis to crisis. That’s not sustainable. We’ve had MQM’s insurgency in Karachi, the tribal belt burning for decades, unrest in Balochistan, and now new fires in AJK and GB.
So yes, Pakistan doesn’t have the same mass mobilization as Nepal or Bangladesh. The reason is fragmentation—there’s no real nationhood. Pakistan is a conglomerate of nations, each with its own grievances, fighting in different ways. A united front is easier to isolate and crush. Instead, Pakistan faces multiple, scattered uprisings—from Generation Z protests to TTP militancy to Baloch insurgents—each in their own language. This, I believe, is leading Pakistan toward a different kind of state collapse. It may not look like others, but the data points are all there.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So Eric, Hussain sees a chaotic Pakistan with multiple battlefronts. But in recent weeks, the Trump administration appears to be pivoting away from India and toward Pakistan. When I spoke to Professor Steve Hanke of Georgetown recently, he observed a pivot away from Delhi and toward Islamabad. Do you see that happening?
Erik Sperling: Yes, and it’s causing panic in DC. India was central to the US strategy of countering China through projects like the IMEC corridor, uniting Europe, the Middle East, and India to keep China out. It was a bold, bipartisan plan. Now Trump’s pivot toward Pakistan is seen as unstrategic and destabilizing that vision.
As for why Trump is doing it, nobody is certain. Some speculate it’s India’s failure to congratulate him, or other grievances. Maybe he’s using Pakistan as leverage to pressure India. What we do know is that some in the State Department have worked hard to connect Trump with Pakistan’s regime, and for now, they’ve succeeded.
But I don’t see it as lasting. Pakistan’s promises aren’t serious, but they’re music to Trump’s ears—oil, minerals, crypto, deals with his associates. This regime is skilled at saying exactly what outsiders want to hear. That works in the short term, but over time, pressure will shift the dynamic again.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hussain, what’s your take?
Dr Hussain Nadim: I see this through a theoretical lens. There has been a collapse of institutional memory in US foreign policy over the last 15 years. Each new president repeats the same mistakes. Dictators worldwide understand this and exploit the rupture points that appear during transitions. For a few months, institutional memory resets. If you charm the new president then, you win short-term gains until he figures you out. Pakistan’s establishment has mastered this dance.
It’s surprising Trump fell for it despite this being his second term. But Pakistan remains a small player in a big game. Still, it offers one crucial thing:
Dr Moeed Pirzada: What is that crucial thing? Compliance?
Dr Hussain Nadim: Absolute compliance. Pakistan offers more than asked—if you want two birds, it’ll give four; if you want the moon, it’ll promise Mars and Jupiter too. The power of promises matters more than delivery. Grand promises create narratives that give instant wins. Announcing oil projects, minerals, or crypto ventures—whether real or not—gives a US president a quick boost and strengthens Pakistan’s establishment domestically.
It never lasts. Within six months, reality catches up. Great promises lead to great setbacks. This script repeats over and over. US and Pakistan have learned to dance with each other—neither fully trusting, but never breaking either.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So Eric, coming back a bit to Nepal. At a time when a pro-Chinese government has fallen, this change can also be seen as a victory for India. But it has happened when Washington’s relationship with India seems more strained than at any point in the last 25 years. So will the fall of Prime Minister Oli’s pro-Chinese government be seen as a victory in Washington?
Erik Sperling: Well, just because Trump is currently causing major anxiety here among the national security class with his treatment of India, it doesn’t mean that people have given up on the entire project. Virtually everyone in Washington who believes in it is still pushing, still trying to right that ship. So yes, people are happy to see China put in a less advantageous position. And I’m sure Trump is too, given how his ill-fated trade war played out.
So yes, there’s still a consensus. Even if Trump isn’t following it, Washington hasn’t shifted. That consensus doesn’t change just because Trump and his core advisers decide on a unique path that wasn’t foreseen.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Moving back to Pakistan, Hussain. I’ve read two observations on social media. One is that if the kind of change seen in Bangladesh or Nepal doesn’t come to Pakistan, a big factor is Imran Khan himself. He has become the central figure of resistance.
As a former prime minister, his resistance was never uncontrolled. Every time people came out, Imran Khan wanted to use his popularity as a bargaining chip with the establishment. He thought that if he brought people out, he could pressure the establishment into negotiations and become prime minister again.
But in Bangladesh and Nepal, the changes were uncontrolled and unpredictable. They destabilized the system without clear direction. Hasina was ousted in Bangladesh, but the country has no clear sense of where it’s going. In Nepal too, after Oli’s fall, we don’t know what setup will replace him. But in Pakistan, because resistance centers around Imran Khan, people don’t have the same energy as in Nepal or Bangladesh. How do you see this observation?
Dr Hussain Nadim: It’s a very good point, and I agree with it at the macro level. Imran Khan’s presence offers hope that things can be resolved in a more civil, non-violent, and political way. But I do wonder how things would change if he were no longer in the picture, because then the element of hope and trust would vanish.
The national security establishment in Pakistan also realizes that as much as Imran Khan is a threat to them, he’s also a trump card—an exit card. They don’t want him completely out of the picture. Because between institutional ego and public madness, there’s a very fine line, and that line right now is Imran Khan. If you remove him, all bets are off, and Pakistan could change in unpredictable ways.
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There’s also a delusion among public intellectuals in Pakistan that because a revolution hasn’t happened, it never will. But history shows otherwise—whether it was Louis XIV in France or the Russian oligarchs, unpredictable outbursts do happen. So yes, Imran Khan is the element of stability keeping the balance of the state intact.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Eric, when you look at Bangladesh and Nepal, the leadership that brings out people isn’t nationally known. They’re not big names, not irreplaceable figures. They’re young, often without political ideology, just angry at the system. Even if police arrest or disappear them, the momentum continues because they’re not driving it—it’s organic.
In Pakistan, however, a leader like Imran Khan is actually a gift to the military establishment. He provides stability, direction, and a framework for negotiation.
Erik Sperling: Yes, although I won’t speak too much to the internal dynamics. Certainly, he could have been a gift, though it doesn’t look that way now, given his confrontation with military leadership. But this is an argument many in the diaspora want to make to US legislators—that Imran Khan is exactly the type of leader Washington should want in Pakistan.
The argument is that change is inevitable in Pakistan, and if you must accept it sooner or later, Imran Khan is the leader to do it. He can unite the country, tamp down extremism, and appeal to educated urban classes. Many wish Washington would understand this. But in the current Cold War framework, the mentality is all or nothing.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: If Imran Khan is indeed the kind of leader Pakistan needs, then why has Washington done nothing in the last three years? Instead, through the IMF, World Bank, and ADB, it has continuously sustained an unpopular regime while doing nothing for Imran Khan, the popular leader.
Erik Sperling: There are many reasons, but one major factor is Washington’s concern that Imran Khan would steer Pakistan toward a more independent foreign policy—at a time when Washington wants countries firmly on its side.
Right now, Washington divides the world into two camps: if you’re friendly with China and Russia, you’re seen as an enemy. Diplomacy or balance isn’t acceptable. They believe China is rising quickly and that they have limited time to slow it down. So in that mindset, an independent Pakistan—even if still friendly to the US—is too much.
It’s unfortunate, because nobody knows what would come after Imran Khan, and chaos or extremism could easily follow. But Washington remains short-sighted. Fortunately, many diaspora voices are working to educate people here about that.
Dr Hussain Nadim: I’ll add one more point. The approach of the current US administration is transactional—who can offer the better deal, and quickly.
What can Imran Khan offer? No military bases for oversight on China or Afghanistan—he’s said absolutely not. No support for US issues in the Middle East or against Iran. So he has little to offer for quick, tangible US gains.
On the other hand, the Pakistani military and state can offer everything—cryptocurrency, critical minerals, concessions on India relations, and more. For the Trump administration, it’s about quick wins to show achievements.
So while Imran Khan may be respected and liked, he doesn’t give them immediate deliverables. The ruling elite, however, knows exactly what to offer, because they’ve dealt with successive US presidents and understand what will work.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: You raised a very important question, Eric. You really need to grapple with this: what can the Pakistani American community, and people who want Imran Khan to be released, actually offer? What’s the quid pro quo? What can Imran Khan offer the American administration? The military has everything to offer—military-to-military ties, COIN, aid leverage—so what about him?
Erik Sperling: That is certainly one of the challenges. People who follow Imran Khan’s movement, as far as I can tell, believe in a sovereign Pakistan with an independent foreign policy, not serving U.S. interests blindly. Maybe it’s not as committed to the war on terror, which cost nearly 100,000 Pakistani lives. Even here in the U.S., it’s hard to defend that war now. No serious person believes the massive killings or the drone program reduced terrorism—it’s widely rejected.
But Washington hasn’t forgotten that Imran Khan opposed it when they were pushing it hard. That makes it a huge challenge. Still, as an outside observer, I would say it’s clear this current system in Pakistan isn’t delivering. It’s not even close. Economically, it’s been disastrous.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But why should Washington care?
Erik Sperling: Because it’s smarter to get ahead of change. If you want a long-term relationship with a country like Pakistan, don’t cling to a rotting, dying regime until the last moment. When change comes, people will remember you were on the wrong side. The smart move is to stand with democracy, build a genuine partnership, and create goodwill with the people and any democratic government they elect.
But in Washington, many still believe what regime officials tell them—that Pakistan can go back to being managed, switching between regime-backed parties, and that people will forget about Imran Khan and democracy. The challenge is to show them that it’s not going back.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But Eric, your assumption is that Pakistan’s military regime is collapsing. Maybe people in Trump’s team don’t see it that way. A prominent Pakistani recently met a senior Trump team member who said, “Don’t appeal to us on democracy. Pakistan has never been a genuine democracy. It only looked like one because of Western pressure. There’s no real internal desire for democracy, so why should we spend political capital supporting it?”
Erik Sperling: Yes, someone could argue that, but it’s pretty clear people in Pakistan do have a hunger for democracy. Polls and movements show it. State Department officials often say the military will always rule, and the military reinforces that narrative. But economically, the system is unsustainable. Eventually, people will demand a government with competitive industries, not one dominated by a military elite that controls major sectors. That setup simply won’t last.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: In the last 24 hours, Pakistan’s democracy movement faced a big setback in Washington. Congressman Jim McGovern of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission proposed Amendment 492 to the National Defense Authorization Act. It demanded that the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense certify progress on rule of law and human rights, and that no civilians are tried in military courts. That was a very reasonable proposal.
But instead, a toothless amendment by Congressman Joe Wilson passed. It says only that after 300 days, the Pentagon should submit a report. This is meaningless in my eyes, and yet it has been adopted by the Rules Committee. Isn’t this clearly a setback?
Erik Sperling: I wouldn’t call it a total setback. If McGovern’s amendment had gone to a vote, it would have been the most significant vote in U.S.–Pakistan relations in 70 years—putting human rights conditions on military training. Yes, it didn’t happen, but Wilson, a hawk deeply tied to the Washington establishment, still felt pressured to introduce his own amendment.
Yes, it’s weak—300 days is sad, given Imran Khan has already been jailed for over 700 days. But even so, this amendment acknowledges that Imran Khan is a political prisoner. When it passes, it will be the first time Congress formally calls him that. It’s not enough, but it’s a building block.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So what politics is Joe Wilson playing here?
Erik Sperling: That’s an open question. He has tweeted “Free Imran Khan” more than anyone else, so maybe he’s genuine. Maybe he’s just offering a moderate proposal that can pass. Or maybe it’s an attempt to keep activism contained.
But the real point is U.S. leverage. If Washington conditioned training or aid on reforms, the Pakistani military would comply—they value U.S. training deeply. We know this because they were furious even at the proposal of McGovern’s amendment. So the diaspora must keep pushing Washington to use that leverage. Otherwise, unconditional training is a green light for repression.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hus, how do you see this Joe Wilson move?
Dr Hussain Nadim: I agree with Eric—it’s a long game. There are no clear wins or defeats. And this isn’t new. Under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act, U.S. aid was tied to certifications on democracy and civilian control. The administration always found a way to certify, even while Pakistani democracy was hollow.
So, these things are mostly narratives and signaling. Wilson’s amendment may not be aggressive, but it clearly mentions Imran Khan as a political prisoner. That acknowledgment matters.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But doesn’t this just give Pakistan’s establishment another 300 days to keep Imran Khan in jail?
Dr Hussain Nadim: I’m not sure it’s that simple. I think it signals: “We’re giving you space to fix things.” That’s consistent with what the U.S. administration has conveyed privately to Pakistan’s military. They’re saying: you have time—fix this before pressure mounts.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But Eric, Imran Khan will turn 73 this October. He’s already been jailed since August 5, 2023—over two years. If McGovern’s amendment had passed, it would have forced the U.S. government to press Pakistan directly on human rights and military trials. That might not have solved everything in a day, but within three months, political prisoner issues could at least have been raised seriously.
Now, with Wilson’s 300-day amendment, it looks like stakeholders just bought another year for the military to keep him in jail. That’s why I called it a setback. McGovern’s language and Wilson’s language are worlds apart.
300 Days? Definitely a typo! Jo Wilson Team can’t be that cynical! @RepJoeWilson https://t.co/K1KGNdRwDh
— Moeed Pirzada (@MoeedNj) September 4, 2025
Erik Sperling: True, but this is also part of a longer process. The advocacy movement is gaining experience and building connections with the right congressional offices. This won’t be the last effort—we have more bills coming.
The State Authorization Bill, for example, could address visas for Pakistani human rights violators. Another could target financial sanctions, preventing regime officials from storing wealth in Western systems. These are all opportunities.
So yes, Wilson’s amendment buys time, but it also keeps the issue alive in Congress. And as more legislators meet Pakistani Americans and learn the reality, more of them will come toward supporting democracy. The movement is building, step by step.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Thank you, Eric. And thank you, Hussain. Today’s discussion made it clear that the similarities between Nepal and Pakistan don’t hold. Pakistan’s political system and power structure are very different, and external stakeholders who shaped Nepal’s change are absent in Pakistan.
Watch the full interview on Youtube: