On 17th September 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a mutual defense pact, according to which, if one country is attacked, it will be considered an attack on both countries. There is a lot of speculation in international media and international capitals as to the true significance of this pact. Dr Moeed Pirzada, CEO and Editori GVS, invited General (Retd.) Tariq Khan to discuss the development.
General Tariq Khan has headed Pakistan’s Central Command, as well as Pakistan’s Strike Corps at Mangla. He has also served across the Middle East in different capacities.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: General, I will come straight to the point. How do you look at the mutual defense pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia?
General Tariq: Moeed, actually, we are discussing something which is still a work in progress, and it would be very unfair for us to make conclusions at this moment. I would like to begin by saying that any kind of agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is probably to the benefit of both countries.
But having said that, I would like to go to international conventions where defense pacts and such agreements are made. There are two essential visible components:
- What is the need for it?
- What are the strategic goals shared between the ones who sign it?
Now, those two are not visible to us in this particular case of the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact. The nature and character of this pact has to be seen and measured against what we know.
First, the nature: it has not gone through the parliament, nor has it been sanctioned by the cabinet. So, essentially, it is a secret agreement, and we don’t know its components. This must be understood.
Second, Saudi Arabia is part of the GCC. So, does Pakistan, indirectly, also become part of a multilateral component of this, or is it going to remain bilateral? It cannot remain purely bilateral. So, it becomes something more than what it appears.
The other aspect is the character of this agreement. At the moment, it is an agreement, not a treaty.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: What is the difference? Because Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, in his tweet, raised the same point. He said he wasn’t sure if Pakistanis distinguish between an agreement and a treaty.
A potentially consequential step in Pakistan-Saudi relations has been reportedly been announced, a mutual defense agreement (not on the level of a treaty, but it’s not clear if Saudi Arabia and #Pakistan make a distinction between a treaty and an agreement) stating that any…
— Zalmay Khalilzad (@realZalmayMK) September 17, 2025
General Tariq: An agreement is something non-binding; you can always get out of it. A treaty is binding. That’s the major difference.
Now, why this happened and how it happened are separate questions.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Before you continue—let me add that I saw a news flash where one of the Pakistani ministers, perhaps the defense minister, said that Pakistan is open to similar requests and arrangements with other Arab countries as well.
General Tariq: Well, when you make agreements of this kind—where an attack on one is considered an attack on the other—you have to be very careful who else you sign such pacts with. It’s not up to Pakistan now to go around signing agreements with everybody. It might sign pacts approved by Saudi Arabia through the GCC, but it cannot go independently because that might conflict with what has been agreed here. But again, we don’t know that yet.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But a common-sense question arises: Pakistan’s arch enemy is India. Saudi Arabia is in no position, militarily, to come to Pakistan’s aid in case of conflict with India. India and Pakistan are both professional military machines. We don’t really know what kind of enemies Saudi Arabia faces, but Pakistan can definitely help Saudi Arabia because of its military machine. So, how can Saudi Arabia help Pakistan?
General Tariq: That’s exactly the point. We don’t know the components of this agreement. The capacities being put together here are not compatible. Saudi Arabia has financial strength, Pakistan has military clout. How do you marry these two?
So, is Pakistan selling its military might and Saudi Arabia buying it? If so, for what purpose?
Now, remember: the GCC countries collectively, without even calling up reservists, have a 400,000-strong military. Their combined defense budget is around $130 billion. Saudi Arabia alone recently signed a treaty with the U.S. worth $142 billion. Compare that to Pakistan’s annual defense budget of only $9 billion. There is a complete asymmetry.
So, how do you bring a poor man into a rich man’s world? Or how do you preserve the rich man’s riches? These are questions that need to be looked at.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But if the combined forces of the GCC are 400,000 plus, with a defense budget of $130 billion, while Pakistan’s is just $9 billion, then why don’t the GCC countries have a powerful military machine?
Read More: Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Defense Pact Doesn’t Offer A Nuclear Umbrella?
General Tariq: I don’t want to sound derogatory, but here’s the reality: there is the gun, and then there is the man behind the gun. It depends on how you groom that man. Do you train him for battle? Do you create an environment in which he can operate effectively?
So, three things matter for battle worthiness:
- The weapon.
- The soldier behind it.
- The environment in which he operates.
That’s where the gap lies.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: What do you mean by environment?
General Tariq: You can’t put a man with a gun in the sea. He has to be in a suitable environment to fight. For example, Qatar is hardly 40 by 20 kilometers in size—it doesn’t even have a defensive line. So why does it need an army in the first place?
These are questions beyond today’s discussion. But let me say this: a lot of people are trying to tie this agreement to Israel.
For example, the bombing in Qatar had nothing to do with Qatar or the Middle East. Not a single Middle Eastern country today threatens Israel. Qatar was bombed to scuttle negotiations, not because of regional military threats.
This agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia could not have been hammered out in two nights. If it was, then it’s hardly an agreement—it must have been in the works for years.
People are binding it to Israel, but I don’t think it has anything to do with Israel.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: That’s interesting, because—whatever little we know—neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia has said this is against Israel. In fact, when Reuters asked a senior Saudi official, he said, “This is not in response to any particular event, nor against any particular country.”
Dr Rabia Akhtar, who is close to the Pakistani establishment, has also published a piece in the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School, saying the same thing—that it’s not against any specific country or event, nor is it a nuclear umbrella, but rather about deterrence.
Still, on social media in Pakistan and abroad, people see this as an anti-Israel pact. Do you think someone is planting that idea?
General Tariq: This is speculation. People are linking it to Israel because of the timing. But as I said, such agreements take years to develop.
Now, some intellectuals are saying this pact has no event behind it. That’s nonsense. You cannot have a defense agreement without a purpose. That’s like buying a movie ticket when the movie doesn’t exist.
Since it hasn’t gone through parliament or cabinet, it remains a secret deal. Its real components will emerge later. For now, we can only speculate about possible purposes.
One major context is IMEC—the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Which is the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor, seen as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative?
General Tariq: Exactly. It was encouraged by the U.S. and signed in Delhi in 2023. The signatories include Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, India, Italy, France, and the EU. But it has not materialized yet because of regional instability—especially the Yemen conflict.
Yemen dominates the Port of Aden and the Red Sea, which makes it central to regional trade routes. This turned into a sectarian proxy war, with Iran backing the Houthis and Saudi Arabia backing the Yemeni government.
Saudi Arabia, along with Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and others, intervened militarily. Pakistan was the only major Muslim country that refused.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Yes, that’s what I wanted to ask. Why did the Raheel Sharif-led establishment in 2015 refuse Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s request for Pakistani troops? You worked closely with Raheel Sharif—what was the thinking?
General Tariq: Raheel Sharif was not personally responsible for refusal. The matter went to parliament. That’s the beauty of parliamentary democracy—the opposition rejected involvement in Yemen.
The Nawaz Sharif government was willing, but parliament said no. The military establishment probably advised the government that this would be unpopular and politically damaging, so better to seek parliament’s ruling. That’s why Pakistan stayed out.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hypothetically, what would have been the strategic thinking behind reluctance?
General Tariq: Simple: Why get involved unnecessarily in a conflict that doesn’t concern us?
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Now, about the threat spectrum—Saudi Arabia can’t help Pakistan against India except financially or through oil supplies. But some argue even oil supplies may not be guaranteed because the Indian Navy could disrupt shipping. What do you say?
General Tariq: The Indian Navy cannot operate inside the Gulf. If they try, they’ll be destroyed by Pakistan’s Air Force. They won’t dare enter the Gulf waters.
As for submarines—the Arabian Sea coastline is not suitable for submarine warfare. Pakistan itself uses submarines effectively, but India cannot employ them effectively in our waters.
The larger point: do Pakistan and Saudi Arabia really need a formal pact to defend each other? Given our historical, ideological, and emotional ties, wouldn’t Pakistan defend Saudi Arabia anyway? And wouldn’t Saudi Arabia, at the very least, provide support to Pakistan?
So this pact must have purposes beyond just “an attack on one is an attack on both.”
That raises another question: Pakistan’s military capacity is China-based. Does this pact mean China is entering this region through Pakistan?
Dr Moeed Pirzada: I saw some speculation in international commentary that, since 80% of Pakistani equipment is Chinese and Saudi Arabia also has a good working relationship with China, this pact means greater Chinese involvement in Saudi affairs and in the region.
General Tariq: Well, to my mind it could be an alternative to the IMEC proposal — this could be CPEC or the Belt and Road Initiative extending into Saudi Arabia, as a challenge to IMEC, and a sign of disillusionment with U.S. policy. The largest bases sit in Qatar and Dhahran and so on, yet they have not been able to protect everybody. So it looks like the Chinese may become more involved in developing the Belt and Road through Saudi Arabia, which could create an economic corridor. Whether it becomes IMEC or the international Belt and Road depends on who runs it.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: I want to come back to this, but a short while ago you said such a pact could not have been worked out in two days. If it had been done in two days, God forbid what they may have agreed. I’ve read in Pakistani newspapers like Dawn that when Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif went to Saudi Arabia for two or three days in March 2025, the coverage said Pakistan and Saudi Arabia discussed the possibility of an expanded defence relationship. There were murmurs before that, which makes me believe — as you said — this wasn’t made overnight. Saudis and Pakistanis have been discussing this for some time. What do you think would be the underpinning of that relationship if it was being worked and discussed for some time? What were they discussing?
General Tariq: Pakistan really doesn’t produce much military hardware, except for one aircraft, the GF-17.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: What about the Al-Khalid tank?
General Tariq: I don’t think the Saudis will buy the Al-Khalid. It may be a big thing in Pakistan, but few outside consider it a tank of real use. We don’t produce much else — MG-1, MG-3 and the G3 rifle — and that’s about the extent of our industry. Military industry is almost zero. So what exactly can we offer Saudi Arabia? Essentially, boots on the ground.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: We can offer Pakistan Air Force squadrons, air-space defence…
General Tariq: Yes, but our air force would have to expand hugely if we are to offer squadrons while still guarding our own skies. Personally, I think Pakistan could become the conduit for China to enter the scene. The Chinese would set up industry, build military potential and capability. If we’re looking at industrial collaboration and local capacity, then we’re looking at a very long-term pact.
You must understand things are changing: the United States is losing its capacity to control the world as a single global power. Multi-power arrangements are emerging. We may see regions controlled within different security orbits. China figures large in this area. If China enters the scene, it could help bring regional actors closer — for example, it might facilitate rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran — which could stabilise the balance of power.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Is there a rapprochement between Iran and Israel?
General Tariq: Sorry — I misspoke. I meant Iran and Saudi Arabia, not Israel. Saudi Arabia and Iran may become closer, and China could bring them together, probably. But this is all speculation.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: I’ll remind you: in February 1945 there was an important meeting on the warship Quincy between Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) and the Saudi monarch King Abdulaziz. That arrangement was based on the United States providing security to the Saudi monarchy in return for uninterrupted oil supply. That U.S.–Saudi security bargain has held for about 80 years. What assumptions or requirements underpinned American security for Saudi Arabia, and why might that be interrupted now — such that Riyadh looks to Pakistan or China to enter the scene? What disappointment is there in Riyadh with the United States?
General Tariq: Personally — I was there during the Gulf War and saw how the Americans operated. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, I don’t think the Americans needed to get there in the way they did; in my view that was a false-flag operation.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: A false-flag operation — you mean the Kuwait incident?
General Tariq: Yes. The operation was designed to get Iraq to enter Kuwait so the Americans could then carry out their operations. That is one contention; you can read accounts that make the case. But that’s ancillary to our main discussion.
What happened after that was that when the Americans settled in the Gulf — I served as a military adviser in the region and saw U.S. ships and bases being built — they amassed significant power: large bases in Qatar, airbases, and so on. Gradually the Americans began calling the shots. Local rules operate differently, but the presence and influence of the U.S. became dominant. Now some in the region feel they are being overly controlled and want to reduce that dependence. That’s speculative, but it’s the dynamic.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So what was the American collective security model for the Middle East? MBS has repeatedly said he is disappointed and wants more comprehensive security. What is the basis of U.S. security that Riyadh found lacking?
General Tariq: Saudi objectives included greater U.S. engagement in Yemen and more aggressive posture against Iran. The Saudis expected the Americans to be more prominently involved — to commit forces, protect sea lines, and so on. At times they perceived the Americans as not doing enough: losing assets in Yemen, withdrawing carriers because the straits are narrow, and not taking the kind of kinetic steps the Saudis wanted. Those were Saudi expectations the U.S. did not always meet.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Are Saudi insecurities driven mainly by Yemen, eastern Saudi unrest, insurgencies and tribal issues — the kinds of internal threats that demand collective security from the United States? If so, do you think China could play the same role and defend the monarchy against political turbulence?
General Tariq: There are two very different approaches. The Americans tend to take a “my way or the highway” style — a kinetic, gun-backed diplomacy. China pursues expansion through soft power, economic investment and infrastructure. If Saudi Arabia wants to move away from kinetic, American-style security and toward stability via economic ties and reconciliation, it might welcome a Chinese role. If the Saudis think peace with Yemen and a Chinese security-economic block is preferable, then this pact makes strategic sense. If that’s the reason the pact was signed, it may be a reasonable path forward.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So what will the Pakistani military do in Saudi Arabia? When you said the only thing we can provide is the boots on the ground — say, if there are Pakistani divisions in Saudi Arabia, what would be the role of the Pakistani divisions?
General Tariq: No, we were once… I wasn’t part of that initially, but I was later on there. In the 1980s, Pakistan had an armored brigade in Tabuk, and that was against Israel. But that time is finished, it’s gone. The Americans kicked Pakistan out of Saudi Arabia, and after the Gulf War, they made sure we left. We didn’t stay on in Saudi Arabia.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So the Pakistani brigade was in Tabuk in the 1980s. But was there any real ground threat to Saudi Arabia from Israel at that time?
General Tariq: At that time, there was a perceived threat. In the 1980s, there was this idea of safeguarding against Israel. So the armored brigade, about 10,000 troops, was stationed in Tabuk. I myself operated on the Karbala road, but that was during the Gulf War. After the war, when we tried to secure an agreement with Saudi Arabia to stay, the Americans made sure we left. They didn’t want Pakistan to be inside. They wanted to be the sole power dealing with the Saudis. Now, we are only speculating on what this new arrangement means, because we don’t know the facts.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Publicly, the trigger seems to be the attack on Doha on 9th September. According to Israeli sources, Israeli planes didn’t enter Saudi airspace but flew across the Red Sea, and near Jeddah they fired air-to-ground ballistic missiles. Many people speculate that Israel doesn’t even have such missiles capable of hitting 1,500 km into Doha. But that was the apparent trigger: the Saudis felt insecure because of the Israeli Air Force. Right? If that is the case, then Pakistani boots on the ground are hardly a deterrence unless there is a serious presence of the Pakistan Air Force. Since 7th May, the Pakistan Air Force has been discussed as a formidable machine. But you said Pakistan Air Force cannot be in Saudi Arabia. So what exactly is Pakistan offering Saudi Arabia?
General Tariq: First of all, the Israeli attack on Doha — the idea that it was only from the Red Sea is nonsense. One possible route was from Jordan into Saudi Arabia, flying across its length to hit Qatar. That’s probably what they did. Another option was through Iraq, but that would have alerted Iran’s air defense. So I personally think they flew through Saudi Arabia. If you research, you’ll see the route shows Saudi air controllers were complicit. Refueling aircraft even took off from Qatar, refueled the Israelis en route, and returned. This was a dirty arrangement. It may have even been one of the reasons that pushed the Saudis toward this new agreement.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But if this is the reality, then how can Pakistani boots on the ground change anything?
General Tariq: That’s exactly the point — they can’t. The Pakistani agreement becomes a conduit for China to enter. China will make the difference, not Pakistan. Pakistan has a limited number of squadrons — maybe 30 in total. How can we post them in Saudi Arabia and still defend our own skies? We don’t have that capacity. At best, we can provide pilots, but then our own defense is weakened. So Pakistan alone cannot change the dynamics.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Who controls Saudi air defense? I was reading that after the 2019 Houthi attacks, CENTCOM increasingly took a role in coordinating Saudi airspace.
General Tariq: I don’t know for sure, but I’m certain it’s true. There’s no way Saudi or Middle Eastern airspace is controlled by anyone other than CENTCOM.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So if CENTCOM already controls Saudi air defense, and Pakistan is invited in, does that mean CENTCOM will cede its role to Pakistan?
General Tariq: That’s the real question. If China enters this region, will American bases close? Because if they don’t, China cannot operate here.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: America has 19 bases in the region. Maybe not in Saudi Arabia specifically, but 19 in total.
General Tariq: They have air bases in Saudi Arabia too. Bahrain has one of the biggest. Do you know how many air bases the U.S. has worldwide? Over 700. Compare that to China, which has only two outside its borders. Nothing in the Middle East can fly without U.S. air defense being involved. So if China or Pakistan come in, they would need U.S. permission to operate.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Hmm. That raises difficult questions. But another big elephant in the room is Gaza. What do you think is the endgame? Is there any future for Hamas left?
General Tariq: Yes. Hamas hasn’t been damaged as much as the civilian population. Israel can’t destroy Hamas the way it wants, so it kills women and children instead. This is genocide. They want to empty out Gaza, but they’re not succeeding. The war will only end with a two-state solution recognized by Europe and the wider world. Some countries like Iran and Iraq push for a one-state solution with Arabs as the majority, but that’s too extreme to be accepted. The two-state solution is more likely.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But in recent days, Prime Minister Netanyahu visited West Bank settlements and declared the two-state solution dead. He said this is all Israeli land. This Gaza war, this attack in Doha, they’re all meant to avoid a ceasefire and push Palestinians out of Gaza. That’s what Israeli papers are saying.
General Tariq: Yes, you’re right. That’s their aim. But the question is whether they can achieve it. Hamas is still striking back — ambushes in the West Bank, inside Israel, IED attacks. The Israelis are hiding their casualties, but Hamas has inflicted losses.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: So what is the endgame? How will Arab states react? The Doha Declaration was very weak despite the attack. Fifty Arab and Muslim states met, but Gaza was barely mentioned beyond old rhetoric.
General Tariq: It’s not about Arab states; it’s about the Muslim world. When countries meet on such issues, they have to think about their capacity to escalate. But the Muslim world has no place on the escalatory ladder. They won’t act militarily, so nothing will change. Just like we’ve been sweet-talking about Kashmir without results.
Read More: The Way Forward
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Are you expecting something at the UN after 21st September, when France, Australia, and others push for recognition of Palestine?
General Tariq: Yes, I expect that. But if it happens, it’ll come from the Western world, not the Muslim world. Muslim states will follow, not lead.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Coming back to Pakistan–Saudi Arabia: there’s speculation about a nuclear umbrella. What’s your view?
General Tariq: Pakistan is a signatory to international nuclear agreements. We cannot extend our nuclear capability to other countries. Doing so would bring massive global pressure to dismantle our program. So this pact will not involve a nuclear umbrella, despite speculation.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: Okay, last question. In the past 36 hours, U.S. President Donald Trump said they’re in touch with the Afghan Taliban and plan to regain the Bagram Air Base. What does this mean?
General Tariq: It likely means funding will be released or agreements made. The U.S. wants to return to Bagram with Taliban approval this time, not by force. That base will allow them to monitor Pakistan, China, and the whole region. It will also help them tap into Afghanistan’s minerals and trade.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: But General Sahib, the U.S. re-entering Afghanistan with a military base is a bigger development than the Pakistan–Saudi pact. How is this even possible?
General Tariq: It was always possible. The U.S. was never really expelled from Afghanistan; it left by choice. It has kept channels open with the Taliban all along. The Taliban aren’t recognized internationally, largely because of U.S. pressure. Now, with Afghanistan starving, the U.S. has leverage to strike a mutually beneficial deal.
Dr Moeed Pirzada: What an amazing development. I’ll end here, but I’d like to revisit this Afghanistan angle with you soon. Thank you so much.
Watch the full interview below: